
IAI-TESEV
REPORT

TURKEY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

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REPORT

edited by Giovanni Gasparini



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INDICE

Preface, <i>Giovanni Bertolone</i>	5
Introduction, <i>Lorenzo Forcieri</i>	9
1. Turkey's Accession to the EU: its Potential Impact on Common European Security and Defence Policy, <i>Meltem Müftüler Baç</i>	13
2. Turkey and the Paradoxes of Evolving Geopolitics, <i>Alessandro Politi</i>	29
3. Turkey and the European Union: a Security Perspective, <i>Sahnaz Yilmaz</i>	51
4. A Strategic Approach, <i>Giovanni Gasparini and Stefano Silvestri</i>	65
5. EU – Turkey Military Convergence, <i>Sadi Ergüvenç</i>	75
6. Military and Industrial Aspects of Europe-Turkey Relations, <i>Sandro Ferracuti and Michele Nones</i>	87
Conclusions, <i>Stefano Silvestri</i>	97

PREFACE

Giovanni Bertolone

Turkey, as an essential staging-point for European and NATO security in the last 55 years, has always had a key role in maintaining the geopolitical balance in the Mediterranean as well as in the Near and Middle East. Half a century ago it formed the frontier of NATO on its south-east edge, and it wisely exploited its position of neutrality in the Second World War to its own advantage. Its political reliability was guaranteed by Atatürk's state system, lay and modelled on the example of European states, and by its strategic position between the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Mediterranean.

Today, fifteen years after the fall of the "iron curtain", from the end of the open opposition between East and West, the role of Turkey in the security policy of the old continent seems essential in a modern-day situation even more complex than in the past, in which the very absence of a clear conflict between the two traditional blocs has brought about a proliferation of global security threats and a radicalisation of regional conflicts with no apparent end.

This Italian-Turkish study, the result of an intense collaboration between the Istituto Affari Internazionali and Tesev, begins from a very clear premise. Turkey has no need to demonstrate its "Europeanness" to be entitled to participate in the European Union, or to play a key role in security, politics, the economy, or in the social and cultural development of the continent. Europe is not only the land of glittering capitals like Paris, London, Rome, Berlin, or Brussels. Europe is also Prague, Budapest, the Baltic, the Balkans. In this Europe, seen in its entirety,

Turkey, even with its clear, natural, and legitimate political, economic, social, and cultural differences, has been an integral part for more than 500 years.

The benefits and potential problems created by the entrance of Turkey in the European Union are an aspect of particular interest to this study, which (thanks to its multidisciplinary approach and the different perspectives analysed by the Turkish and Italian research team) has succeeded in outlining not only the Eurocentric viewpoint but also that of Turkey, where a lively debate is already underway between pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics over EU membership and Turkey's possible future role in the Union.

Today membership in Europe has come to be seen, in Turkey, as the conclusion of a process of modernisation that has lasted almost a century, and as an essential opportunity to address important issues for the country more impartially, issues such as Islamism or movements toward autonomy. In Turkey, debate takes place over the validity, the advantages, and the problems created by the necessity of making important constitutional reforms requested by the Union. Another question is the effect of entry into the Union on the structure of the armed forces – today the institution most highly regarded by the population – and how the system, which has guaranteed the country's security since its foundation, will change. These are quite obviously themes which, given the geostrategic position of Turkey, become extremely important for the security of the whole continent.

This importance is well understood by those in Europe who believe in the strategic benefit of moving the boundaries of the Union, of the inclusion of the eastern Mediterranean within the EU, of the enlargement of the economic sphere of the Union from the Atlantic to central Asia, and, a result not to be discounted, with the end of the myth of the "difference" of Islam, with the definitive defeat of those who still believe in a clash of civilisations based on religious values.

Turkey, thanks to the prestigious figure of Mustafa Kamal Atatürk – who, displaying an enviably pragmatic approach, while he was saving the country destroyed an obsolete institutional and political structure based on the sultanate and caliphate – is today a country proud of its traditions but also of its aspirations to become a full partner with, and to play a key role in the security of, a European Union that is ever growing toward the east and south of the continent.

Alenia Aeronautica, a top-level player in aeronautics, and therefore of high technology and innovation, is proud to have supported this study.

The analysis of the evolution of geostrategic scenarios – like this one on Turkey – beyond being a means of evaluation for the world of politics and culture, and for public opinion, is also essential for an industry like ours, because it provides us with tools to help us think ahead, to anticipate possible work requirements, and to adapt what we offer to the real demands of institutional clients. The defense industry undertakes a role which, though it often appears mysterious, can be appreciated, in the light of what emerges in this study, as essential to guarantee that formless yet invaluable commodity: security.

(Translation: Anthony Majanlahti)

INTRODUCTION

Lorenzo Forcieri

The discussion about the enlargement of the European Union to include Turkey, concentrates on numerous factors of an institutional, political, economic, social, and identity-based nature, but seems to leave out considerations of a strategic or security-based nature, or, at least, that these aspects receive but little attention. The joint study by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Turkish Foundation for Economic and Social Studies (TESEV) of Istanbul has sought to fill this gap, clearing the field of prejudices and preconceived explanations in order to open a dialogue based on factual elements and perspectives about our common future. It seems to me, therefore, of great interest, and the study should be examined in all the offices involved in studying and discussing the candidacy of Turkey in the European Union.

For historical and political reasons, the enlargement of the EU to include Turkey is a decision that will have a very strong impact, not only on the economy and on European society, but also on the evolution of security and defense dynamics in one of the “hottest” and most interesting areas of the world for Europe in general and for Italy in particular.

The area of the Black Sea and of the larger Mediterranean, all the way to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, represents at the same time an opportunity and a risk for our country, both of the utmost importance. Repeated crises in the Near and Middle East continue to underline the need for a political stabilisation of the area through the solution of endemic problems and the definition of a model of cohabitation among the different peoples who dwell there with their traditions, cultures, and religions.

Turkey finds itself astride the two principal crises of the start of the twenty-first century, Iraq and Iran, and is on the border of other hot zones, like Libya and the Caucasus.

This closeness to the crisis area is often presented as a reason to penalise Turkey in its European aspirations. Logic, however, would suggest the contrary: any distancing of the country from the European community would, indeed, aggravate these crises by rejecting the political, military, and cultural support of an allied and Westernised country with an Islamic majority and, leaving aside the risk of favouring extremist elements within Turkey itself, would give a negative signal to those in the Islamic world who might look with favour upon a relationship of close collaboration with the West.

From this point of view, particular attention should be given to the theme of European and Italian energy security, which could benefit from a progressive stabilisation of the area of the Caspian, where Turkey has been involved for some time.

Turkey has been part of the Euro-Atlantic community since 1952, the year in which it joined NATO, thereby actively contributing to more than 50 years of our, and Allied, collective security. We therefore have a solid basis upon which to construct a new and closer relationship between Europe and Turkey, but this experience must be given more weight, as it does not seem to play a part in public opinion, in the mass media, and in the mindset of European political decision-makers.

Certain problems still remain, which Turkey must resolve with the end of encouraging its integration within Europe. In general these are linked to internal legal matters (guarantees of individual freedoms and the protection of minorities), and to certain aspects of its international politics (the Cypriot question). Italy must use its good offices to contribute, within preexisting international initiatives, to a definitive solution of the issues on the table, without shaking internal European stability or damaging the collaboration with NATO and the European Union. Progress achieved in the dialogue with the Kurdish minority, thanks in part to the prospect of membership in the EU, needs to be translated into stable and permanent solutions that European nations must help to enable.

It should be kept in mind that Turkey in very great measure shares the perceptions and the agenda of European security, including opposition to international terrorism by radical Islamism, a belief in the efficacy of non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the stability of the Mediterranean, and of the Gulf. Thus there is a shared attention to security upon which it is possible to build a larger and more solid relationship.

Recent years have witnessed a certain rebalancing of the pre-eminence of the bilateral relationship of Turkish-American security, with a resulting progressive approach toward European positions and multilateral environments. The Turkish interest in the process of integration within the European defense system, of which Italy has always been a promoter, is linked, as well, to the perception of a progressive decline in American interest in NATO, as well as the traumatic experience of the Iraq crisis.

This process of drawing closer to Europe in defense is, however, undergoing worrying pauses following the institutional crises that afflicts Europe and which diminishes its external credibility in the ambit of foreign policy and defense. The Euroscepticism prevalent in certain European countries must not be permitted to distance Turkey from reaching its vital goal of full EU membership, an objective also important symbolically to make a clear point against the viewpoint that a "war of civilisations" exists between Turkey and the West.

This will require a double process of transformation, European and Turkish. There is a reciprocal responsibility to make the EU ready to welcome Turkey and to make Turkey ready to enter the EU; this is true in every area, but perhaps even more important when we consider the sector of security and defense.

On the part of Europe it is necessary to perform a process of institutional adjustment, in particular in the process of policy decisions, as well as opening the current institutions of the PESC and the PESD to the Turkish ally.

For Turkey the process of inclusion in European structures will take place through reform and modernisation in the defense sector, according to outlines which Italy, too, must follow. An operative and technological collaboration in the area of defense will be a factor of the utmost importance for the success of the whole operation. The present level of interoperability and cooperation, although remarkable, is not sufficient to confront the global security challenges over the arc of the crisis described above.

Such a process of convergence under the aegis of European Security and Defense Policy will be possible only if, in the decade that divide Turkey from entrance into the EU, we will be capable to associate it with existing institutions, like the European Defense Agency (EDA), and with the creation process of common forces, like the battle groups.

Outside the realm of capabilities and shared missions, in which there have already been successes upon which we can count and build further

progress, one must bear in mind a greater industrial collaboration in the defense sector. Turkey must be encouraged, though the offer of significant cooperation and partnership, to adopt a strategy which joins a greater European involvement to the traditional area of American action. Italy and Turkey are ideal partners for the development of such cooperation because they must confront similar problems: they share the same concerns about the stabilisation of the Mediterranean area, and they can count on a relationship of mutual trust. As a result I believe a political initiative should be established in order to encourage a closer relationship between our two countries.

(Translation: Anthony Majanlahti)

1. TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EU: ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

*Meltem Müftüler Baç**

1. Introduction

On October 3, 2005, Turkey's relations with the EU entered a new era with the start of accession negotiations. With these negotiations, the European Union is confronted with a decision of great importance about Turkey's accession as a full member to the EU, particularly because there is a great reluctance among the European public towards Turkey's membership. In the 1990s, Turkey's membership prospects did not look too bright, despite the fact that it had a special relationship with the EU as the only country with the longest standing association and a legal basis of eligibility for its membership.¹ Turkey's relations with the EU entered a new phase with the European Council's Helsinki summit of December 1999 when Turkey became an official candidate for EU membership. The Helsinki Presidency Conclusions stated "Turkey is destined to join the EU under the same conditions as the

* The author gratefully acknowledges the support provided by the Turkish Academy of Sciences, GEB_P program, for this paper's research and TESEV-IAI support.

¹ Turkey signed its Association Agreement with the then European Economic Community in 1963, the Ankara Treaty which noted Turkey's eligibility for EU membership, in addition Turkey's Association Agreement was the only Association Agreement along with Greece which was based on Article 237 of the Rome Treaty. The Agreement's Article 28 stated that "When both parties are ready to fulfil the obligations arising from EEC membership, Turkey's accession is foreseen".

other candidates". In the December 2004 summit of the European Council, the EU member states decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. This is a major step for the EU with a significant impact on the future of Europe, and presents the EU with a challenge as an international actor.

This paper argues that Turkey's prospective membership to the EU will have a crucial impact on the European Union's security aspirations and 2nd pillar development. There are two related propositions here: the first proposition is concerned with the Turkish contribution to European security and the second proposition is concerned with Turkey's impact on transatlantic relations. In the post Cold War and post 9/11 international environment, Turkey's role in European security has changed in response to international restructuring; this is parallel to the changes that the EU has been undergoing. It is, therefore, to be expected that in today's uncertain international environment, Turkey and the EU have a convergence of interests for their security interests. In addition, most of the international conflicts that the EU will find itself facing in the near future will be in Turkey's geographical proximity. That is partly why Turkey's accession will be crucial in determining the EU's role in international security. According to Chris Donnelly, special advisor to NATO Secretary general, "Turkey is now the keystone state for Western security in general and European security in particular".²

In the post 9/11 period, a major challenge confronting the EU is over the threats posed by Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism as illustrated by the terrorists attacks on Istanbul, Madrid and London in 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. The divide between Islam and Europe has deepened since 9/11 and it presents serious security risks for the EU in the near future. Turkey could possibly play several roles: first, it could play a symbolic role in demonstrating that Islam and European values are compatible, second, it could increase the EU's capabilities in dealing with terrorist threats and third, since it has sound, well-established and credible relations with Europe and the Middle Eastern countries, it could act as a broker between these countries.

The international system is going through a major transformation in the 21st century with increased uncertainty and volatility. In that background, the European Union, as an emerging international actor, is acquiring a new international role for itself. The EU's international

² Chris Donnelly, "The occupant of a pivotal role in the defence of the EU", *Financial Times*, London, June 28, 2004, p.3.

role could not have been easily foreseen, as there was always a great deal of reluctance among the European Union members to play a role in European security. This is changing in response to a systemic transformation at a global level. The EU finds itself in a position to increase its capabilities to deal with the new security risks; this, in turn, is bringing new international roles to the EU. In that context, Turkey's possible accession to the EU becomes crucial in affecting the future of the EU's security role. This is an important revelation especially if one considers the level of public opposition to Turkey's membership in the EU countries.

Within the theoretical lenses of this paper, rational intergovernmentalism, the way to conceptualise Turkey's position in the EU, passes through the perceived benefits of Turkey's membership and Turkey's impact on European security is one of the main benefits for the EU of Turkey's membership. The rationalist, utilitarian-based explanations of enlargement argue that EU governments make their decisions based on the perceived costs and benefits of the candidates;³ in the Turkish case, the perceived costs of membership has so far dominated the debate on Turkey's accession to the EU. This paper aims to uncover a potential benefit for Turkey's accession to the EU mainly based on security, since Turkey's impact on EU's security aspirations is an important factor to consider in an analysis of Turkey's future with the EU. This is, of course, not to claim that the EU will have to accept Turkey as a member at any cost, merely for security reasons. The EU should not change its accession conditions because of the implications of Turkey's geostrategic importance or because of the changing international environment.

This paper only attempts to address one potential contribution of Turkey's membership to the EU from the security perspective. Based on a utilitarian perspective, the material benefits of Turkey's accession to the EU in the security realm will have an important role in influencing EU member states' preferences and the public opinion in the EU. It is for this reason that the German Foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, claimed that "In order for the EU to be powerful and for our children and grandchild-

³ For theoretical basis, Andrew Moravcsik 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1993, Vol. 31, no. 4, pp.473-524 and Meltem Müftüleri Baç and Lauren McLaren, "Enlargement preferences and policymaking in the EU: Impacts on Turkey," *Journal of European Integration*, 2003, vol.25, no.1, pp.17-30.

dren to live in peace, Turkey needs to be a member in the EU".⁴ Similarly, German Interior Minister, Otto Schily, claimed that Turkey's accession to the EU "would show the world that it is possible for Muslims and the West to live together on the basis of the values of enlightenment and the UN Charter of human rights".⁵ If the European public is convinced in the EU that Turkey's membership is beneficial for their future, then their opposition might lessen and their anger at the governments of making decisions over their heads would decrease. The Turkish contribution to the EU in foreign and security policy could easily influence public opinion. If the public perceives that Turkey provides net benefits for the current problems Europe faces, then it might be less reluctant towards Turkey's accession. In other words, the preferences of the EU member states towards Turkey in terms of security could be one of the issues that could be used to win the public's favour and support for Turkey.

A second important component of Turkey's EU membership is tied to the Turkish position between the USA on the one hand and the EU on the other hand. In the post 9/11 international environment, the transatlantic divide deepened as some European Union members and the USA found themselves at odds over the definition of security risks and proper responses to deal with these security risks. Turkey finds itself in an undesirable situation in that if it meets the American demands, it might jeopardize its relations with the EU. Thus, Turkey's accession to the EU carries serious implications for the transatlantic divide and will add an additional layer of complexity to transatlantic relations. Especially in the light of the divide between USA and some EU members, Turkey's accession to the EU will be a critical development in transatlantic relations. In addition, Turkey's critical position at the crossroads of the Caucasian, Central Asian and Middle Eastern energy routes is important in assessing the strategic value of Turkey for European security. To further elaborate on the impact of energy security is beyond the scope of this paper, but it should nonetheless be mentioned as a critical factor.

This paper will focus on Turkey's contribution to European security in the following manner: first, Turkey's EU membership carries significant security challenges for international security, particularly important here is the Islam vs. Europe divide. Second, Turkey will contribute significantly to the EU's military capabilities, since one of the major prob-

⁴ Hürriyet, Turkish Daily newspaper, 2 September 2004.

⁵ The Economist, "Charlemagne: How terrorism trumped federalism", October 2, 2004. p.31.

lems confronted by the EU is the capabilities/expectations gap; the Turkish membership might increase the EU's military operability, both in terms of logistics and bases. Third, Turkey's accession to the EU will enhance the EU's position in the Middle East, especially considering emerging international dynamics; this will be a major contribution.

2. The European Union as an International Actor

The European Union is becoming an international actor on its own right that requires the adoption of new tools and mechanisms to increase integration at the political level: particularly important here is the fact that the EU needs to develop mechanisms to exert military power. This is why since 1998 the European Union is increasing its role in European security with the St.Malo declaration between the United Kingdom and France. With the 1999 Cologne summit of the European Council, the EU decided to increase its military capabilities and to incorporate the WEU as the defense arm of EU as foreseen with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. The 1999 Helsinki summit became a turning point when the European Council agreed to create a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) with the aim of deploying 60.000 troops for at least one year that would be able to carry out the WEU's Petersberg tasks. This is important to note because in 1999, the EU's objective in European security was very narrowly defined through the Petersberg tasks, mainly humanitarian missions and peacekeeping activities. Parallel to the EU's adoption of new tools to exert its presence in European security, NATO and the EU began to develop new venues of cooperation. The move toward NATO-EU cooperation is deeply rooted in the 1996 Berlin summit of NATO and the EU's increased role in security automatically led to the emergence of new arrangements and modalities for EU-NATO cooperation. For that purpose, 4 ad hoc working groups were created between NATO and the EU in 2000; in addition, in July 2000, NATO and the Secretariat of the Council of the EU agreed on a security arrangement for the exchange of classified information between NATO and the EU. However, the developments made "Turks fearful of being second-class allies who could be called to fight but excluded from a share in com-

⁶ John O'Sullivan, "The Curse of Euro-nationalism: Why the USA should beware the EU", *National Review*, August 6, 2001, p.33.

mand”.⁶ The main Turkish concerns for these developments were that Turkey feared it would be excluded from European security - to which it has contributed since 1952 as an active member of NATO - and its security concerns would not be recognized. These concerns led to the Turkish insistence on the application of the Washington decisions taken in the NATO summit in April 1999 where NATO members agreed that in case of EU-led operations, the EU’s access to NATO assets would be decided on a case-by-case basis in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) where Turkey has full voting rights. The EU demands were for automatic access to NATO assets and its planning facilities. The Turkish resistance to these institutional changes in European security has even led to the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s accusation that “Turks were using the situation to get in to the EU through the back door”.⁷ The modalities of cooperation between NATO and the EU were largely shaped to address Turkish concerns and sensitivities on the one hand, and on the other hand in recognition of the role that Turkey could play for the future of European security.⁸

The breakthrough deal on NATO-EU cooperation came in December 2002 summit of the European Council where it was decided that “the Berlin-plus arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU member states which are also either NATO members or parties to the ‘Partnerships for Peace’ and which have consequently concluded bilateral security arrangements with NATO”.⁹ This meant that when the EU leads an operation using NATO assets, only EU members who are also NATO members could participate. The Copenhagen deal also effectively held Cyprus and Malta out of the EU’s 2nd pillar and forbid the release of NATO classified information to these two EU members, thereby addressing another major Turkish concern. The Copenhagen arrangements also allowed Turkish participation in EU-led

⁷ “NATO’da Türkiye-AB restle_mesi’, Hürriyet Turkish Daily newspaper, December 15, 2000.

⁸ I have addressed the Turkish concerns and the subsequent developments in Meltem Müftüler Baç, ‘Turkey’s role in the European Union’s Security and Foreign Policies’, Security Dialogue, vol.31, no.4, December 2000, 489-502 and Meltem Müftüler Baç, ‘Turkey and the European Security’, in Towards a European Security and Defence policy – positions, perceptions, problems, perspectives, edited by Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Nomos Verlagsanstalt, Baden-Baden, Germany, 2002, pp.206-216.

⁹ The Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 12-13 December 2002, Annex II-I,

http://www.ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf

operations in its immediate vicinity if it chose to do so. The EU-NATO cooperation was highly important for the EU's operationalization of its security and defense role and it also highlighted the important role that Turkey plays in that aspect even though it is not a EU member. Following the Copenhagen deal, the EU was able to take over from NATO the operation in Macedonia in spring 2003, EUFOR Concordia. Turkey also participated actively in this operation and in all the operations that the EU was involved in the Balkans, after that.

However, the major impetus for the EU's security role and Turkey's impact on European security came with the September 11 attacks against the USA. The security challenges of post 9/11 period also impacted Turkey's role in European security. "As NATO's only Islamic member and a state with some influence in Central Asia, Turkey's strategic stock rose. Winning its agreement to - and thus potential participation and support for - CESDP operations consequently became even more important".¹⁰ In November 2001, the EU created a European Capability Action Plan-mostly likely to prepare its capabilities for the future security issues. It should be noted that the ECAP was established right after September 11 attacks against the USA. Thus, the systemic shake that 9/11 caused also alerted the EU to its own potential weaknesses. In December 2002, the EU issued a Declaration on the ESDP with the intention to establish rapid reaction battle groups of 2000 troops in nine different units, the aim was to be able to deploy troops very quickly in any part of the world by 2007. In addition, the NATO-EU Capability group was established in May 2003 in order to increase the interactions between these two organizations and in order to have some level of harmony between the EU's ECAP and NATO's capabilities commitments agreed in Prague 2002.

The European Union has started to put its security aspirations to practice in 2003 with various operations in the Balkans and Africa. The EU's military operations to date in the light of these institutional changes are 'Operation Concordia' in March 2003 when the EU took over from NATO in Macedonia, and in 2004 Operation Althea in Bosnia. When Operation Artemis of 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo was successful, this provided the incentive to establish a new mechanism for the EU to realize and further its security aspirations. Accordingly, France, Germany and UK decided to create battlefield groups of 1,500

¹⁰ Mark Webber et al., "The Common European Security and Defence policy and the 'Third Country' issue", *European Security*, vol.11, no.2, summer 2002, p. 88.

troops in an attempt to increase the EU's Rapid Reaction capabilities. The EU as a whole adopted this initiative in order to develop the Union's capabilities in 2004. These are in line with the EU's attempt to deepen its integration in the second pillar and to acquire more military muscle. It should be noted that in order to secure its borders, the EU does not only rely on military measures: civilian controls and police force are important tools as well. The EU's role in such areas has been developed particularly under the Finnish and Swedish presidencies. The EU's police and gendarmerie forces play an important role for the future of EU's security role. For example, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands agreed to create a European Gendarmerie Force-EGF to be operational by 2005, a Force of 3000 police officers that would be used to restore order and fight organized crime.

In order to fully assess the emerging role of the EU in European security, one needs to look at the Strategy Document for European Security adopted in the EU Council of December 2003. With this document, the EU identified its main security concerns as terrorism, illegal trafficking of drugs and people and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Strategy document for European security focused on the dangers of instability in the perimeters of the EU, especially in the Mediterranean and the Middle East region. Instability in the Mediterranean Region carries significant security threats for the EU, as it would have the capacity to diffuse into European territory.¹¹ In addition, stability in these regions is essential to prevent unwanted migration from the Mediterranean to Europe. Similarly, terrorism in these areas constitutes a major threat for the EU. This is a very important development as it ties the EU's future plans for its own security to the region where Turkey is located. In these areas, Turkey's role will be highly important for the EU. It is in line with these institutional changes that the EU is adopting in order to enhance its role as an international actor that Turkey's membership to the EU has become important. The next section addresses the possible impact that Turkey will have on these institutional developments with regards to the EU's international role.

¹¹ Dieter Mahncke, Wyn Rees, and Wayne Thompson, "Redefining transatlantic Security relations, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2004.

3. Turkey's impact on European Security

Turkey has been an integral part of European security since the end of World War II. When it became a member of NATO in 1952, it acquired a central place for European security as the Southeast bastion of the Alliance. The containment of the Soviet Union created a convergence of common interests between the Europeans and Turkey. According to the transactionalist theory, the creation of security communities such as NATO leads to a sense of community between its members.¹² Thus, Turkey as part of the Western Alliance during the Cold War years was a part of the community and belonged to the Atlantic Community. The end of the Cold War in 1989 dramatically changed that situation: Turkey suddenly found itself at the margins of Europe, as the main role that it played in European security-containment of the Soviet Union was no longer needed.¹³ This created a major change in Europe towards Turkey, as the main element of its inclusion, security against the USSR, no longer seemed crucial. Turkey was a part of the European identity mostly symbolized by NATO during the Cold War; however, with the systemic changes in 1989 it found itself increasingly marginalized in the new European order. In addition, there was a divergence between the USA and the EU over the role that Turkey would play in international security in the post-Cold War era. The USA perceived that Turkey still played an essential role in European security because of its role in Middle Eastern security and in the most volatile regions in the world; that is why the USA throughout the 1990s has actively pressured the EU to enlarge towards Turkey as well. But the effect that the American support to Turkey had on the European leaders was not positive, as illustrated by French president Jacques Chirac's comment that: "Not only did he [Bush] go too far, he ventured into territory which is not his concern; it would be like me telling the U.S. how to run its affairs with Mexico."¹⁴ The Europeans, on the other hand, were more reluctant to see Turkey as part of the new European order that is emerging in the

¹² Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.

¹³ I have addressed the main impact of the end of the Cold War on Turkey's position in Europe in Meltem Muftuler-Bac, *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1997.

¹⁴ In Turkey, Bush urges Muslims to trust U.S., give democracy a chance to grow William Neikirk. *Knight Ridder Tribune Business News*. Washington: Jun 30, 2004. pg. 1

post- Cold War era. The divergence between the USA and the European Union over the definition of security risks, the mechanisms developed to deal with these risks, the role for NATO, the shaping of international system, complicated Turkey's already shaky position in the European order. This uncertain position is furthered by Turkey's relations with the European Union and its consequent security formulations.¹⁵

The role that Turkey would play for European security in the post-Cold War era was not a sufficient enough benefit for the EU to grant Turkey a membership in the EU. Thus, all throughout the 1990s, Turkey's integration to the EU have been particularly problematic, However, two major developments-the Kosovo crisis in 1999 and the post 9/11 international restructuring have increased the value that Turkey had in European security, as a consequence the EU begun to perceive Turkey's role in European security in a different fashion since 1999.¹⁶ What is important here is to note that the potential value of Turkey in enhancing the EU's security role will be one of the benefits of Turkey's membership. Depending upon the EU member states' preferences over the EU's security role, this benefit will be perceived differently; there is already a divergence within the EU over the Turkish role. For example, the United Kingdom values the security aspects of Turkish membership more than a neutral state such as Austria. There are two important questions here: what is the relative power of the member states which favour Turkey's membership because of its impact on European security, and what is the relative power of those who do not? Second, in what areas does Turkey's EU membership contribute to the EU's security role?

In answering these two related questions, one could focus on the following factors: in the European Union's fight against terrorism, Turkey would be an important card and make Huntington's clash of civilizations argument- Western civilisation versus the Islamic civilisation,

¹⁵ Gulnur Aybet & Meltem Muftuler-Bac, "Transformations in Security and Identity after the Cold War: Turkey's problematic relationship with Europe", *International Journal*, vol, 55, no.4, December 2000, pp.567-582; Tarik Oguzlu, " The Clash of Security Identities: The Question of Turkey's Membership in the European Union," *International Journal*, Vol. 57, No. 4, 2002, pp: 579-603.

¹⁶ A number of papers have addressed this issue, see for example, Antonio Missoroli, "EUNATO cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP", *Security Dialogue*, vol.33, no.1, (March 2002), pp.9-26; Tarik Oguzlu, "An Analysis of Turkey's Prospective Membership in the EU from a Security Perspective", *Security Dialogue*, vol.34, no.3, (September 2003), pp.285-299.

void.¹⁷ An important question to pose here is that whether Turkey's version of Islam will enable the EU to claim Western values and Islam are compatible. This is an appropriate question to pose because for all the Arab countries of the Middle East, Turkey is not perceived as fulfilling Islam's main requirements. Given the fact that in the post 9/11 period, the main threat to European values and security comes from terrorism, which has fundamentalist Islamic origins, Turkey's role might be essential. This is of course not a very straightforward issue, as Turkey could also bring new security risks because it has a Muslim population. However, the fact that Turkey has been a secular democracy and part of the European order for more than a century indicates that this is a small risk. In addition, "As a long-standing NATO member, Turkey has been a crucial part of Europe's defences. It has been a beacon of good sense in a combustible bit of the world".¹⁸ Turkey is, in response to the requirements of this change, transforming its military. "Instead of a large, heavy, and cumbersome army, Turkey is transforming its armed forces into a swift, mobile, flexible cadre with rapid deployment capabilities available for out of area operations".¹⁹ Thus, Turkey's military capabilities will increasingly adapt to the EU's new strategic objectives and enhance the EU's military operability.

As for Turkey's impact of the Mediterranean dimension of European security, one needs to point out that Turkey's accession to the EU will mean that the EU's Mediterranean population will be around 40% of the EU. This will dramatically alter the EU's strategic objectives and priority areas in its CFSP. It will necessitate new action on the Mediterranean issues and significantly alter the geographical weight of the EU, which is currently on MittelEuropa. Turkey's possible accession then could breathe life into the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership and Dialogue for the EU. There is a significant area of cooperation between NATO and the EU over the Mediterranean region: NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue since 1994 and the EU's new emphasis on the Mediterranean that goes beyond the Euro-Med cooperation overlap. Since Turkey is an active NATO member, its role in the Mediterranean dialogue could also contribute to NATO-EU cooperation. As the High

¹⁷ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.72, no.3, (summer 1993), pp.22-48.

¹⁸ *The Economist*, "Turkey belongs in Europe", December 7, 2002, vol.365, no.8302, p.12.

¹⁹ Stephen Lanier, "Military Trends in Turkey: Strengths and Weaknesses", October 14, 2004. CSIS, p.17, <http://www.csis.org>.

Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana declared in 2003 “the integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean”.²⁰ Thus, Turkey’s accession to the EU would be a perfect instrument in achieving this goal as declared by Solana for the Mediterranean.

Turkey’s contribution to the EU’s foreign policy could also be judged in terms of its impact on the EU’s new Neighborhood Policy, and in addition for securing access to energy from the Middle East and Caucasus. An important consideration here is that the main threats to European security come from the Middle East. If Turkey’s accession would counter these threats, then this would form a very strong argument supporting Turkey’s accession. This is important because instability in this area has the capacity to diffuse into the European Union territories. Turkey’s value significantly increases when one considers the impact that Turkey’s membership will have in the Middle East. Currently, the security risks from the Middle East come from nuclear activities in Iran, war in Iraq, the EU’s role in the Middle East peace process and terrorism. This is particularly noteworthy given the fact that the EU’s Strategy document for European Security aims to increase the EU’s ability to stabilize its perimeter and the European Constitution’s Neighbourhood policy. Turkey’s possible accession to the EU is also a ray of light for the authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes, it illustrates that democracy is possible in a country with a predominantly Muslim population. An important question that comes from that perspective is whether Turkey could play a buffer role between Europe and the Middle Eastern countries. This would be crucial if we would approach the issues of security increasingly from the perspective of alienation and lack of social ties between Europe and the Middle East. In addition, Turkey could directly contribute to European security through its diplomatic ties and relations in the Middle East. Turkey tries to have a policy of engagement in the Middle East, especially in terms of Western relations with Syria and Iran. When Abdullah Gul, the Turkish foreign minister, visited Israel in January 2005, he was able to voice a significant concern about the Israel and Palestinian issue and suggest a mediator role for Turkey in the

²⁰ Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy”, December 12, 2003, p.9.

Palestinian-Israeli peace process as well as critical negotiations between Syria and Israel for the coming years. Of course, Turkey is not the sole actor that could impact a settlement but its friendly ties and regional power status would greatly enhance the EU's position in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Its recent role in bringing Israel and Pakistani ministers of foreign affairs in Turkey to discuss new avenues of cooperation is a further proof of Turkey's regional role. For example, "Silvan Shalom, the Israeli foreign minister called the meeting at an Istanbul hotel 'historic' and 'a huge breakthrough'.²¹ This was an important step in normalizing relations between Israel and the Islamic countries and it was largely through the Turkey's broker role that it became possible.

However, a major crisis erupted in February 2006 when Hamas leaders visited the AKP party in Ankara following the Hamas electoral victory in Palestine. The visit created a tension in Turkey's relations with Israel and the USA. Even though, it was not an official state visit, nonetheless, it demonstrated the delicate balance Turkey needs to attain in the region where it is located.

To turn to the 2nd major impact that Turkey would have on European security: in terms of military operability of the EU operations and Turkey's contribution to these, Turkey would be very valuable for two main reasons, its military bases and its military capabilities. Turkey has the second largest land forces in NATO after the USA, and ranks 5th in terms of naval forces, it has 10.5% of NATO's fighter jets, 20% of cargo planes, and 22.5% of inventory jets.

Turkey has a substantial military capacity especially in the region where it is located and given the fact that most of the future threats to European security could come from the Middle East and the Mediterranean, in realpolitik terms, Turkey's participation in European security is essential for the EU. Turkey has a very high level of defence spending, with 4.9% of its GDP in 2003 totalling 11.7 billion dollars and has engaged in a major military modernization. In the post Cold War era, Turkey played an active role especially in the Balkans crisis and participated in the UNPROFOR with 1,450 troops in 1995, later on contributed to the NATO's IFOR and SFOR (1, 200 troops) significantly. During the Kosovo campaign, Turkey participated with 10 F-16 air-

²¹ Steven Erlanger and Salmon Masood, "Historic Meeting for Israel and Pakistan", New York Times, September 2, 2005, p.A6.

craft and later on contributed to the NATO's KFOR (940 troops) and it was a dependable ally for the Europeans and actively contributed both in terms of troops and logistics. When SEEBRIG-South East European Brigade was created by Turkey, Macedonia, Romania, Greece, Italy, Albania and Bulgaria, Turkey became a very active contributor to that project as well and the first commander for the Brigade was a Turkish general. In addition, "Turkey has highly mobile forces with greatly enhanced firepower in accordance with NATO's new strategic concept".²² According to Chris Donnelly, the core of the EU "has to some extent lost sight of the value of armed forces as an element of guaranteeing security. The US, UK and Turkey are countries, which, by contrast, have learned that armed forces are essential to national survival".²³ This creates a philosophical problem between these countries and the rest of Europe. This is an important note because Turkey, UK and to a certain extent Italy have different visions of security concerns that the rest of the EU, and that is partly why these countries support Turkey's EU membership more than core, continental Europe such as France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg.

Since 2002, Turkey has played a very active role in the fight against terrorism; it performed in the ISAF-International Stabilization and Assistance Force very respectably. When Turkey took over the NATO forces' command in Afghanistan in 2003, it was relied on heavily and it resumed command at the beginning of 2005 with 1,400 troops. Turkey took over the ISAF command for a period of 8 months in 2002-2003 period and was reappointed to act as the ISAF command in February 2005. In addition, NATO's civilian representative in Afghanistan - a post created to provide stability - is a former Turkish minister of Foreign Affairs, Hikmet Cetin. Turkey's active participation in the multilateral efforts in Afghanistan illustrates its capacity to significantly increase the EU's military capabilities. What is particularly important here is not the fact that Turkey played an active role in these missions, but it played them within a multilateral setting, demonstrating its partnership qualities.

In terms of EU-led operations, Turkey has been more than willing to contribute since the EU agreed on its RRF in 1999. The main problem in that aspect was the modalities of cooperation between NATO and the EU which was finally resolved in 2002. The agreement reached in

²² The CIA World Factbook, "Turkey", <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/tu.html>, 2004.

²³ C.Donnelly, 2004, p.3

October 2002 for allowing the participation of non-EU NATO allies in European security and defence policy incorporated Turkey closer to the EU led security operations, in fact Turkey participated in all EU-led operations since 2003 with the exception of the operation in Congo. In the police operations in the Balkans, Turkey turned out to have an active place in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Turkey's active role in these operations demonstrates the impact it will have on the EU's operability, which is crucial in closing the EU's expectations and capabilities gap. An important illustration of the Turkish role in closing that gap is with respect to the EU armaments. For example, in the project for the development of A400M transport aircraft, Turkey is one of the 8 participants with a possible purchase of 10 aircraft.²⁴

It is, however, important to note that Turkey's position for European security is an important aspect of Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU. Foreign policy coordination will be very important in the overall negotiations process. It also has the capacity to affect public opinion about Turkey, as the European public is hesitant about Turkey's membership in the first place. Turkey's coordination of its foreign policy to that of the EU will be a crucial step in winning that approval. That is why this paper addresses the impact of Turkey's accession on European security.

4. Conclusion

Since its Association Agreement with the EC in 1963, Turkey's relations with the EU have been problematic. In the last decade, as the EU began to enlarge towards the Central and Eastern European countries, Turkey's ambivalent position has become clearer. This paper argued that within the ambivalent position, an important benefit that Turkey's accession to the EU revolves around the EU's security concerns. This is, to a large extent, independent of the EU's security aspirations, whether the EU will continue on the hard road of further integration remains unclear, especially in the light of the referendums in France and the Netherlands for the Constitutional Treaty. What is clear is that the EU will need to take more responsibility for its own security specifically in the post 9/11 international environment. This is why Turkey's role matters, both in terms of a more abstract level and in terms of concrete

²⁴ Dieter Mahncke, Wyn Rees, and Wayne Thompson, *Redefining transatlantic security relations*, Manchester, Manchester University press, 2004, p.38.

military capabilities. If one considers that the EU's security concerns are mostly on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and trafficking of humans and drugs for the next century, than Turkey's geographical location becomes critical in furthering security goals based on these concerns. As Ian Lesser notes, "Turkey is most directly affected by a key trend shaping Western security: the erosion of traditional distinctions between the European, Middle Eastern and Eurasian theatres....Turkey is at the center of this phenomenon and the country's future role will be strongly influenced by it."²⁵ Thus, this paper argued that within the rational intergovernmentalist theoretical lenses, Turkey's main potential utility for the EU would be on the EU's 2nd pillar development. This, however, does not mean that the EU will have to accept Turkey as a member because of these concerns, just the opposite there is already a process well underway and this paper stresses the potential value of Turkey's accession to the EU from a very narrow perspective, that of security.

²⁵ Washington D.C, 2000, p.207.

2. TURKEY AND THE PARADOXES OF EVOLVING GEOPOLITICS

Alessandro Politi

“Politics are like a train, they never stop too long” - a former Italian Communist politician once said. I would submit that these words are a perfect match with the unexpected, non-linear and non-evolutive changes that a great extent of the world and Turkey in particular is facing. The immediate past cannot be a guide unless it is placed in a long-term context and then forecast into a future that continues to surprise conventional thinking.

1. The Geostrategic Past of Turkey

If one looks at the geographical and geostrategic elements characterising the position and role of what is today called Turkey over the past 6,000 years (i.e. also taking into consideration the routes of diffusion for vegetable and animal comestibles during the agricultural revolution), one can understand that the quite early and recurring geopolitical divisions between the Balkan peninsula and the Anatolian region take place in the common strategic system of the Straits and the Aegean Sea.

In other words, the two peninsular masses have witnessed recurring and often successful efforts to establish at least a belt of bridgeheads or of sovereign powers on the opposite coast, when not to unify under a common sovereignty the whole strategic system. The war of Troy and the Greek colonisation of Asia Minor, the Persian wars against Athens, the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the Roman conquests of Asia Minor,

Macedonia and Greece, the Byzantine empire, whose geostrategic successor was the Ottoman empire, were all more or less lasting episodes of the geostrategic unification or recomposition of geopolitical realities that were different, but ended sharing long periods of coexistence under a common political denominator.

One can remark that the Aegean/Straits system is a subsystem of the wider Mediterranean Sea/Black Sea complex, but it is interesting to observe that the periods of geopolitical unification of this area are limited to the Roman Empire before its division and to a much more fragmented hostile sharing between recent Arab Muslim powers and the Northern Mediterranean Christian powers. Relatively more frequent are the cases of more or less extensive, extended and disputed thalassocracies in the Mediterranean, that is, the Minoan, Greek, Phoenician/Carthaginian, Roman, Arab, British and US cases. Moreover, after the Roman empire, the control of the Straits of Gibraltar and their surrounding coasts by a single power has been much less frequent and lasting (Arab conquest of Spain, Spanish conquest of the Rif).

In fact the periods where the Aegean/Straits geostrategic system was split were relatively short: during the time of the Diadoches, towards the end of the Byzantine empire and after the treaties of Sevres and Lausanne till the beginning of the Cold War. The Rome-Berlin Axis tried to control this area (invasion of Greece, assault on Crete, conquest of the Northern shore of the Black Sea), but failed due to Turkish neutrality, even if Turkey could just retain the Straits and was completely excluded from the Aegean. In fact the Truman line (drawn as the containment frontier along the USSR during the Cold War), is the last (and still lasting) reunification of the Aegean system under the NATO alliance and the US hegemonic power, despite the geopolitical rivalry between Greece and Turkey, precisely for the control of this sea and its fringes (i.e. Cyprus).

In this respect it is interesting to note that in comparison the Black Sea has a much more reduced geostrategic value, compared with the Aegean one, most probably for the combination of the absence of naval culture and communication facilitating archipelagos.

For any power established in Anatolia, beyond the central question of controlling the Straits and the Aegean Sea, the next priority is to control the access to the Anatolian plateau and peninsula. This was true when the border areas were called Cilicia, Cappadocia and Armenia and it is true today along the Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, Georgian and Armenian

frontiers: if the established power does not control either directly or through political influence the related buffer zones, sooner or later it will lose control over the whole peninsula. This helps to explain why the Byzantine empire disappeared, albeit after a long struggle, and why the Ottoman or Turkish governments did not refrain from any means in order to secure areas inhabited by Armenians or Kurds, or to eliminate the potential fifth column of Greek settlements along the Aegean coasts of Turkey (although this was more a question of controlling the coastal fringe of the Anatolian plateau in order to avoid the risk of encroachments and dismemberment).

The strategic heritage of these realities (Aegean/Straits strategic system and control of Anatolian access) is embodied by the following issues:

- the Armenian-Azeri conflict on Nagorno Karabakh and its historical origins dating back to the First World War;
- the Kurdish question, with its implications in Iraq, Iran and Syria;
- the Greek-Turkish contentions in the Aegean, including the Cypriot partition.

2. What is the Viable Heritage?

Turkey has been for at least a generation described as a bridge or a gateway, but, if one takes into account its past, it can have in principle at least seven possible roles:

- A. a centre of significant, but limited political irradiation, if it does not control the sea;
- B. the outpost of an empire, if it controls varying extents of territory in the Near and Middle East, but not the seas;
- C. the gateway of an expanding Euro-Mediterranean empire creating a new extended *koiné*, independently from the origin of its power (major Mediterranean peninsulas or Central Asiatic steppes), if it enjoys at least a the control of part the Mediterranean and Arabic Seas;
- D. the bulwark of a local entity;
- E. the trade terminal and the gateway between China and the Mediterranean;
- F. a neo-nationalist bastion;
- G. an advanced position of a global block.

Let us see how this historically static heritage matches with actual realities and how it may be viable.

Despite all the idle talk about empires, this traditional constellation of power is extinct in modern world, although neo-imperialist tendencies are far from being a dangerous dream of the past.

On the other hand, the problem today consists in the uncertain transition from the failed attempt of creating a unipolar world towards a new, and for the time markedly more unstable, multipolar world. In the medium term one of the main issues for major decision-makers will be the management of the more or less long (and hopefully gradual, if not gracious) decline of the US global hegemony with its attending consequences and opportunities. The defeats experienced in the Third Gulf War (the invasion of Iraq in 2003) and in Colombia, will most probably not be admitted by the George W. Bush administration, but will have far reaching consequences and do not necessarily indicate, as US extremist Republicans hoped, an indefinite continuation of US supremacy.¹

If one assumes this trend as a working theory, the possible heritage from Turkey's geopolitical past are hypothetically D (bulwark of a local entity), E (trade terminal and gateway between China and the Mediterranean) and F (neo-nationalist bastion), since the function of global block advanced position will not be continued if Ankara will enter the EU.

Before arguing in more detail the difficult situation of this country, it is necessary to quickly dispel one tacit, but persisting assumption among Europeans and non-Europeans: Europe could be another superpower. The old Gaullist dream of creating a counterweight vis-à-vis the global power of the USA, is the product of Cold War logic and it could not be otherwise, yet it is unrealistic and useless for EU interests. It is interesting to note that the appeal of a superpower status was not sufficient in France to obtain a majority in the referendum (29/5/2005) for the approval of the EU Constitutional Charter and was not an argument used in the Dutch debate on the same issue (1/6/2005).

A superpower is a global actor that invests heavily in military expenditures and means in order to support significantly its other dimensions of

¹ A third possible defeat could happen in Afghanistan if the USA and other coalition countries decide to divest politically and militarily, leaving the country more in the hands of drug lords rather than Taliban.

power. The USSR was the example in a Socialist and centrally planned economy and the USA are the winning specimen in capitalist economy, but both share the importance that the military-industrial-information complex has in budget allocations and policy planning and both are examples of a formidable, but hardly sustainable over-development of some governmental functions.

The European Union, notwithstanding its evolution from a purely civil power towards an ESDP, due to the trauma of the wars of Yugoslav dissolution, has consistently since 15 years no intention and, despite all the surrounding political rhetoric, no serious advantage in following the superpower line of evolution. A mixture of political, social and cultural constraints (which make some commentators mistake Minerva for Venus and cold historical experience for paradise), together with conscious political choices and unexpressed political instincts, make sense also to the wider European public that superpower status is neither the future of global politics nor the vocation of the Union as such.

Turkey, after a desirably shorter accession phase, will not be a peripheral military garrison of a supposedly Christian club, but one of the more than thirty members that have common borders to care of, thus excluding the function of military outpost.

Being the trade terminal and the gateway between China and the Mediterranean is an attractive role, which in principle could be carried out by Turkey also as a stand-alone country, imitating the secular role of Byzantium.

That said, the revival of the Silk Road will not happen by itself, first of all because modern maritime trade and air liaisons have replaced caravans and secondly because the political economies of the countries affected, from China to Turkey, have still to make careful choices on the development of this route. For the time being, the development of Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas resources appears to be the only real economic engine, while smuggling and drug trade are the only grey economic activities that support traffic on this land communication line. It remains to be seen if China's economic development will be predominantly sea-bound or if there will be a continental diffusion.

Nevertheless in a global economy being part of an integrated market and of an expanding currency has distinct advantages, also taking into account that the old Silk Road can be revived only through significant investments and by transforming the largely grey economies that flourish along that route into modern sustainable economies.

D and F, respectively the role of bulwark of a local entity and that of a

neo-nationalist bastion, are essentially the same. They represent simultaneously at best the necessity and the temptation of the failure of integrating in the EU. Even supposing, as Suat Gun did a year and eight months ago, that Turkey would be equipped with nuclear weapons in order to keep a regional balance vis-à-vis Iran, Israel and the USA,² it could be a very limited strategic horizon, to say the least. The deterioration of the military co-operation with Israel (which could strengthen the connections with Arab and Islamic countries), the interest in a relationship with Iran and even the 200 million of Turkish speaking people around the country,³ would not give a nuclear Ankara more leverage than today's Islamabad should have.

The crisis of NATO, the main country's strategic tenet since 1952, explains and goes hand-in-hand with the crisis of bilateral relations, although with different timings. The bilateral crisis starts, quite underestimated, in 1991 with the second Gulf war and is confirmed in the third one (2003): once its anti-Soviet function terminated, Ankara refused twice to be engaged by the USA in the Middle Eastern or Greater Middle Eastern strategic theatre. Apparently also the preceding efforts of the Turco-Iraqi Pact (1955), superseded by the short-lived Baghdad Pact, renamed in 1959 CENTO or METO, were not particularly fruitful and practically faded by 1971 (officially it had its termination in 1979 with the Iranian revolution).

NATO's crisis simply stems from the major changes on both sides of the Atlantic since 1948: today's Europe and the USA are not the same as in 1948, their interests are different and the way they perceive and embody their ideals is vastly different. To put it in another way, despite flowery comparisons with the Magna Carta, the North Atlantic Treaty is obsolete and is not democratically and legally coherent with its successive political adaptations. What is worse, the Alliance, having already experienced serious rifts in Kosovo (1995), has been politically killed mainly by the US refusal to take all the political and operational consequences entailed by the invocation of article V (15/9/2001), after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, and by Washington's insistence on the concept of coalition, instead on that of alliance. This puts Turkey in the difficult position of moving from one practically extinct alliance towards a still to be

² See Suat Gun, Erdogan's visit to Iran, *Ortadoğu*, 4/8/2004.

³ Turkish National Defence Ministry, *The White Paper*, Section II, p. 3, 1/8/2000; <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/birimler.htm> (14/3/2005, h 23,11).

consolidated political and common defence Union, requiring a careful review of political, diplomatic, strategic and procurement choices.

Luckily, for time being, there is no such massive and direct threat like the one experienced with Soviet Union during the Cold War. On the contrary:

- the old armed rivalry with Greece has been consigned to the past (although diplomatic skirmishing is still quite intense, especially around the Cyprus issue);
- Syria is more worried with its internal and “close abroad” transitions than with border, PKK or water disputes;
- Iraq is a stability risk, but not a heavily armed aspiring Gulf hegemon;
- Israel is still the most powerful and non declared nuclear weapons state of the area, but faces the challenge of re-discussing the fundamentals of colonisation in the occupied territories, with the Gaza withdrawal as a significant precedent;
- and Iran, taking also its military nuclear intentions at face value, is too much engaged in a delicate duel/dialogue with the USA to represent a significant threat for Turkey.

These can be halcyon days before a major regional tempest catalysed by the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq and unwelcome developments regarding the Iranian crisis, but precisely for this they should be fully used to reshape all available means and muster all possible support.

Artists can often interpret more freely and directly the Zeitgeist and the Angst of a country than seasoned politicians or analysts. Even if the book *Metal Firtina* (Metal Storm, 2004) can be as wrong in some essentials as the celebrated *Is War Now Impossible?* (1899) First World War prediction of the Polish banker Jan Stanislavovich Bloch, and even if the film *Kutlar Vadisi Irak* (Valley of Wolves Iraq, 2006) has been branded as a stereotyped and divisive film, both are a sign that one must look at the world without preconceived ideas and ready to, as Herman Kahn wrote, think the unthinkable.⁴

On the other hand, it is also interesting to see what are the attitudes of the public vis-à-vis the USA, as measured by the annual survey *Transatlantic Trends* (all numbers are percentages).⁵

⁴ Even if both artefacts can be judged unfounded and ill conceived, as a matter of fact they had a huge success and the government did not distance itself from the film.

⁵ *Transatlantic Trends: Topline data 2005*, GMF Compagnia di S. Paolo Fundação Luso-Americana Fundacion BBVA, July 2005.

Q2a. *How desirable is it that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very, somewhat desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable?*

Very desirable	7
Somewhat desirable	10
Somewhat undesirable	20
Very undesirable	53

Q2b. *How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very, somewhat desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable?*

Very desirable	22
Somewhat desirable	28
Somewhat undesirable	15
Very undesirable	25

Q3. *In thinking about international affairs, which statement comes closer to your position about the United States and the European Union?*

The US should remain the only superpower	7
The EU should become a superpower like the US	41
No country should become a superpower	43

Q5. [EUROPE] *Do you think a more powerful European Union should compete or cooperate with the US?*

Compete	37
Co-operate	35
Both	10
Neither	8
Do not know	10

Q10. Next I'd like you to rate your feelings toward some countries, institutions and people, with one hundred meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from zero to one hundred. If you have no opinion or have never heard of that country or institution, please say so. [A sample of the answers given in Turkey]

USA	28
Russia	24
Israel	14
The EU	50
Palestinians	49
Germany	44

Q12b. Do you think that the partnership between the U.S. and the European Union should become closer, should remain about the same or should the [European Union/United States] take a more independent approach from the [United States/European Union] in security and diplomatic affairs?

Closer	27
Remain as close	14
More independent	48
Do not know	11

Q13. Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?

Still essential	52
No longer essential	32
Do not know	16

Q14. Here is a list of statements about NATO. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of them:

d. [EUROPE] NATO is dominated by the United States, Europe should have its own defence alliance separate from the US

Agree somewhat	27
Disagree somewhat	14
Disagree strongly	13
Do not know	17

This survey shows quite clearly some strong aversion vis-à-vis the USA and also how, albeit deemed indispensable, NATO is not considered an untouchable alliance, even within a very pro-Alliance country.

3. The Details in the Strategic Change

Unsurprisingly the first major change in the strategic setting of Turkey concerns the **USA and their role in the world and the region**. If one compares the situation described by the Turkish MoD White Paper⁶ with the actual one, the differences are quite important and go well beyond the 9/11 tragedy and its immediate consequences. Today the marking event is the defeat of the US forces in the Iraqi theatre by the combination of the Sunni armed revolt, the terrorist campaign of local and foreign jihadist groups, the failure to win hearts and minds of the majority of the Iraqi public, the unwillingness and lack of means to increase the number of troops, the diplomatic stalemate in mobilising the support of other countries in the pacification of Iraq, and the erosion of coalition and domestic support.

The USA have been defeated because after three years:

- Combat operations continue and with more casualties than during the Blitzkrieg of March 2003.
- Far from being isolated and desperate, rebels and terrorist are able to continue sustained operations.
- The coalition troops do not control the country beyond the range of their weapons, do not contain the insurgency just within the so called

⁶ *Defense White Paper*, Turkey MoD, Ankara, 1/8/2000.

Sunni Triangle and do not control the capital (15/2/2006 12 attacks with 150 dead), while risking to be caught in a widening civil war (second half of February 2006).

- President G. W. Bush had declared the willingness to stay all the time that was needed to win, possibly with an open ended deployment of troops (2004), while one year later the decision is taken to prepare for a first diminution of the force by 2006 and British information leaks acknowledge that military presence is part of the problem and not of the solution, revealing that the retreat is planned by Spring 2007.

As in every guerrilla and counter guerrilla campaign, there have been few major pitched battles⁷ and no decisive defeat of the US Army and USMC (US Marine Corps) regiments in any major clash, while the significant effect was the wearing down of US morale at political and public opinion level. The most visible indicators are the drop in US public opinion surveys (from 74% in May 2003, to 60% in March 2004, to 39% by June 2005, to 34 in February 2006)⁸ and the increasing doubts expressed within the second Bush administration, especially from outgoing members.⁹ The major and unrecognised problem by this administration is that it is facing a strategic trilemma:

- retreat from Iraq in order to devote highly specialised pol-mil resources in favour of Saudi Arabia, thus avoiding either chaos or an undesirable government?
- risk losing both newly conquered Iraq and subsequently Saudi Arabia in the wake of a retreat from Mesopotamia?
- assist at the rotting away of both Baghdad and Riyadh in the background of the new and successful Iranian quest for regional hegemony?

⁷ Among major battles one can count: the twin storming of the city of Falluja - April and November 2004; the firefights to mop up the Sadrist Jaish al-Mahdi in Najaf - August 2004; the battle for the recapture of the bridges in an-Nassiriyyah - April 2004; operation Swarmer in Samarra - March 2006.

⁸ Pew Research Center, A year after Iraq war, poll conducted 29/2-3/3/2004, <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=796> (19/7/2005, h 12,35). CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll, conducted 16-18/6/2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/06/20/poll/> (19/7/2005, 12,43). CBS poll in: George Friedman, Of Mosques, Oil Fields and Ports, Stratfor, February 28, 2006 21.37 GMT.

⁹ Official admits errors in Iraq, in *WP*, 13/7/200;

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/12/AR2005071201422.html?referrer=email&referrer=email> (referring to an interview given by former Undersecretary for Defense Douglas J. Feith).

If Mr. Bush does not start to address these issues, the USA will face an even harder strategic transition. Moreover it remains to be seen when the US administration will complete the retreat in Iraq, how it will carry out its media damage control strategy, how the mid-term Congress elections will react to this defeat and how much the defeat will influence the ability of the next Republican presidential candidate to run his own electoral campaign, Yet it is beyond doubt that the defeat will influence deeply the US strategy and possibly grand strategy for the next decade. The defeat could be mitigated by the possibility to retain one major base (in Western Iraq or in the Kurdish region) or it could be significantly heavier if, in one year or after the death of crown prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, the Saudi kingdom could enter an irreversible socio-political crisis, but the result will be that the US strategic position in the Gulf and in the so called Greater Middle East will be visibly weakened. As anticipated in the trilemma, the possible major US pillars in the Gulf were three in succession: Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.¹⁰ Iran will remain possibly unfriendly or less unfriendly at least in the middle term (3-5 years) and probably unwilling to offer basing rights for the next decade; Saudi Arabia's bases have just been lost, due to the increasing instability of Saudi political conditions, and Iraq, by any optimistic evaluation, will not be a fully stable and collaborative country at least in the medium term.

A major possibility to change the disastrous result of the wars in Iraq, and possibly in Afghanistan, is the development of direct talks with Iran. First news were given the 17/3/2006 and high-level Iranian approval to the concept was given five days later, although no date and place were established.¹¹ The main advantage of future talks is to try to enlist Iranian help in Iraq's stabilisation; their main disadvantage is, at least in this initial stage, the US refusal to broaden their political and security content to the controversial nuclear programme issue.

In any case, only by closing the 27-year-old dispute with Iran, also by recognising its central role in the Gulf, the USA can hope to reconfigure with some success their presence in the area.

In terms of military strategy, the National Defense Strategy 2005 and the Quadriennial Defense Review 2006 have significantly shifted the focus

¹⁰ Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar and Diego Garcia, although very important, cannot make up for major bases in one of the mentioned three countries.

¹¹ AP, Iran's supreme leader favors talks with USA on Iraq, Updated 3/22/2006 9:13 AM.

from the need to wage one or more simultaneous conflicts to much more adapted priorities:

- Secure the US from direct attack.
- Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.
- Strengthen alliances and partnerships.
- Establish favorable security conditions.¹²

Main priorities of the QDR 2006 are on one hand drawn from conflict and disaster recovery lessons:

- Having the authorities and resources to build partnership capacity, achieve unity of effort, and adopt indirect approaches to act with and through others to defeat common enemies – shifting from conducting activities ourselves to enabling partners to do more for themselves.
- Shifting from responsive actions toward early, preventive measures and increasing the speed of action to stop problems from becoming conflicts or crises.
- Increasing the freedom of action of the United States and its allies and partners in meeting the security challenges of the 21st century.
- Minimizing costs to the United States while imposing costs on adversaries, in particular by sustaining America's scientific and technological advantage over potential competitors.¹³

On the other they stem from the pressure imposed by irregular warfare successfully waged against the USA:

- Defeating terrorist networks.
- Defending the homeland in depth.
- Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.
- Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.¹⁴

The USA, in sum, together with the regional actors, will have to adapt to a situation where their politico-strategic influence will be visibly lim-

¹² US DoD, *The national defense of the USA*, Washington, 1/3/2005, p. iv.

¹³ US DoD, *Quadriennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, 6/2/2006, p. 2-3.

¹⁴ US DoD, *idem*, p. 3.

ited and where they could begin a long-term retrenchment of their presence, despite the will to keep a wider influence. At global level this would imply hard choices about where Washington wants to preserve its political weight, where it will have to leave to other actors the control of some strategic areas and with which powers it may have to share global primacy again. There are no foreseeable guarantees that the world will witness a neat or durable or a bipolar division of spheres of influence, as in the more recent past.

The second variable of the Turkish strategic picture concerns the **development of the European Union** itself. The EU, notwithstanding the issue of the enlargement towards Bielorrussia, Ukraine and Moldavia, has not still decided if it will carry out a serious political integration, although at different levels for the medium term, or if it will remain a loose network of policies around weak nation-states. The twin rejection of the constitutional treaty by Paris and The Hague has stopped the ratification process and, until April 2006, any significant initiative to restart the political integration process. Only a new Italian government after the elections (10/4/2006) together with a developing EU policy of the German government, could overcome the actual stalemate.

Today the EU, with the exception of nuclear arsenals, is the second global power, but for Turkey it makes a significant difference if it can somehow replace and/or complement the US role or not. In this case Turkey, even being a EU full member, will have to live in a de facto strategic void, unable to fill it by itself and unsure about the degree of strategic support it can receive.

Russia is the third strategic actor to be taken into account. In the medium term the efforts of the Putin presidency to rebuild the country allow to think that there will be no major threat coming from that quarter. Moreover, the accession to the EU of Bulgaria and Romania, will establish the Union's stabilising presence in the Black Sea, complementing the regional positive role of Turkey and of the BSEC (Black Sea Economic Co-operation).

On the other hand, despite some political setbacks in Ukraine and Georgia, Moscow continues to be influential on how Ankara's Caucasic borders may be more or less stable, including terrorist centres in Northern Caucasus and regional conflicts in the whole area. Russia is also relevant in shaping, together with China, India and the USA, the Central Asian strategic environment, which in turn is important for

Ankara's gas needs. Turkey's EU full membership would deeply affect regional balances in the Black Sea and in the Caucasus, transforming the economic terms of reference of the BSEC, yet depending from the political worthiness of the EU itself.

This last variable together with the possible changes within Russia after the Putin era, can either way seriously complicate the position of Turkey vis-à-vis Russia. If one assumes an authoritarian involution of Russian politics (with the further dominance of the power ministries and bodies, called *siloviki*), this can easily imply an increased political and strategic friction between the EU and Russia, notwithstanding the existing US penetration in the area.

A weak EU will find itself into a creeping confrontation without the will and the means to handle it. A strong EU can have a stabilising role, but probably at the expense of more cordial relationships with the next Russian president. A more democratic evolution of Moscow's domestic politics instead could facilitate an agreement with the EU, perhaps limiting Washington's influence, but cannot eliminate a factual divergence of interests between Moscow and Brussels. Turkey would most probably increase its influence in the Caucasic and Caspian region, with visible repercussions on the Persian Gulf via Iran, if it is an EU full member. Naturally, a failure in achieving full membership would risk to isolate Turkey in a rather unfriendly environment.

The **Wider Middle East** will present more security challenges for Turkey, deriving more from the weakness of key actors than from the strength of emerging powers. At least four states are seriously risking by the next two years a substantial failure both in their governments and in their integrity: Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Syria.

Iraq, thanks to the joint efforts of local politicians and of the US embassy, has averted for the time being the risk of a wider civil war after the attack against the Askariyya mosque in Samarra (22/2/2006), but with the present constitution the possibility of a split in three or more regions is far from theoretical. While a political victory of Al-Qa'eda in the land of the Two Rivers seems a distant possibility, the power vacuum created by the Lebanisation of Iraq could have predictable consequences on the Turkish Eastern borders. The future negotiations with the PKK-KONGRA GEL would be complicated, while the Turkish army, weakened by 22 years of counterterrorism, would have more difficulties in fighting a revived Kurdish insurgency.

Pakistan is a country where the central government is since decades losing control over border provinces (FATA, North-Western Province,

Baluchistan), major cities (i.e. Karachi) and politico-religious establishments. Until now the government has withstood the heavy political pressures created by the end of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the contacts between Osama bin Laden and Pakistani nuclear scientists, the consequences of the Abdul Qadir Khan affair, the tensions with filo-jihadist parties, the revolt in Baluchistan, the increased drug trafficking and the low intensity conflict in Waziristan. A possible fall of Pervez Musharraf could entail a quite chaotic transition where neither the control over nuclear weapons, nor the functioning of the state would be assured.

The scenario of an Islamic bomb in the hands of a jihadist chieftain would reverberate at global level, although the most dangerous system for Turkey (SSM-N Ghauri, 1.500 km range) would be difficult to employ for a terrorist group without specific military assistance. One major hope, despite evident internal risks, is the acceleration of the peace talks between Islamabad and New Delhi, allowing the government to shift forces towards more critical areas and, in term, to reduce military expenditures in favour of more productive investments.

In *Saudi Arabia* the main question concerns the stability of the house of Sa'ud itself vis-à-vis the infiltration of al-Qa'eda and the manipulation of the terrorist movement in the dynastic succession struggles. Some non-governmental observers predict that in one year or at the death of the crown prince Abdullah, the kingdom could collapse opening the way to five possible outcomes: a new dynasty, a new military rais, a clerical Wahhabi shura, an Islamic emirate or the disintegration of the country. Each scenario has its own destabilising potential and surely some possibilities are more unwelcome than others, yet each new government will depend from the necessity to guarantee and to share an adequate oil rent to its elite and population, a fact that allows to have a good negotiation starting point with any major oil customer, if the military option will not be precipitously chosen.

Syria, with which Turkey entertains a political dialogue quite distinct from the more aggressive US stance, is being deeply destabilised by the end of its Lebanese occupation. The string of bomb attacks in Lebanon, apparently organised by filo-Syrian elements of the local government, raises serious questions about the active or passive complicities of sectors of the Syrian intelligence services, reverberating in turn on the ability of president Bashar el-Assad to control vital state machinery.

At a politico-diplomatic level the Franco-American pressure on Syria seems reduced and the third UN report on Rafik Hariri's assassination (16/3/2006) is apparently less confrontational vis-à-vis the Syrian

regime, allowing Damascus to try to reassert its influence in Lebanon, to limit increased Iranian influence in Beirut and to serry internal loyalties. Yet the end of the Tikriti and Sunni dominion in Iraq cannot but appear quite ominous to both the Alawi Syrian elite and to its political opposition which ranges from the Muslim Brethren to the outcasts of the family, like Rifa'at el-Assad, to the recent opposition to the Assad family, like Abdel Halim Khaddam.

The collapse of the Alawis, possibly after a botched coup d'état, could confront Ankara with a country replunged into its traditional instability and intestine struggles, like it was before the Assad rule, or with a new Islamic government which, although not necessarily distant in principle from the AKP rule, could be an unknown element in the region.

The failure of each of these countries will, of course, entail also a much stronger jihadi and sometimes PKK terrorist pressure than at present, exposing Turkey to an outright risk of infiltration also through borders considered previously more secure. The same logic also applies to trafficking routes of the organized criminal networks spanning from Afghanistan till Istanbul, with the difference that even now an uncontrolled Iraq is the new channel for arms and drugs towards Turkey and Europe.

The possible emerging, or better re-emerging power, is *Iran*. The main variables are given by the new government policies of president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and by the choice to continue nuclear enrichment activities, that might bring, according to some scenarios, to the construction of one or more nuclear devices. Despite a possibly more marked anti-US slant, it appears difficult to predict a radical departure from established, proven and useful regional policies, which include a good relationship with Iraq first and all regional actors, with the enduring Israeli exception.

At the beginning of April 2006 there were no significant signs that Iran had politically decided to pursue a military programme, since its diplomatic position and negotiating team were unchanged. In fact, by admission of Mr. John Dimitri Negroponte during a testimony to Congress "*We judge that Tehran probably does not yet have a nuclear weapon and probably has not yet produced or acquired the necessary fissile material*".¹⁵

It is not unreasonable to think that, considering global precedents, the Iranian government decided to retain technological control of enrich-

¹⁵ US DNI, *Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Armed Services Committee*, Statement by the Director of National Intelligence, John D. Negroponte to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 28 February 2006, p. 8.

ment as a way to create a deterrent in being, which means to arrive at the bomb-making threshold, without overstepping it. This hypothesis is also consistent with one of the proposals floated during the Russian-Iranian talks, namely to use Russian nuclear plants to enrich fissile material on an industrial scale, while allowing Iran the use of a small enrichment plant for research (probably Isfahan) and for the sake of keeping the legal principle and political point that Tehran is entitled by treaties to control the full fuel cycle.

If Tehran would really pursue a military nuclear programme, this would possibly entail two courses:

- either a quite improbable acquiescence by the USA and the UN P5;
- or the much more probable imposition of sanctions, followed or preceded by some military US/Israeli attack.

In any case, a new unrecognised nuclear power in the Gulf would further complicate Turkey's position, especially because the UK would not be prepared to offer any nuclear umbrella beyond its national interests in a EU framework. France instead would have a more nuanced position in the sense that, if the French president judges that vital interests are threatened through the aggression against allies (also not in the EU), the French nuclear deterrence could come into play. If Turkey would be an EU member, France would consider a "dissuasion concertée" (concerted deterrence), if Turkey agrees to the concept, meaning that the Turkish government would be involved into an ongoing discussion about the protection closely intertwined interests, that might imply a discussion on deterrence, with the caveat that the last word and decision would pertain to French national authorities.¹⁶


A further level of complication would be added by the US posture. On one hand one might assume that the Alliance Strategic Concept (1999, § 62) ensures a supreme guarantee for the allies by the nuclear forces of the Alliance, especially the US strategic nuclear forces, with the overall contribution of French and UK forces, under articles V and VI of the treaty. On the other hand the substantial non sequitur of the invocation of article V after the 9/11 attacks and the notable absence of any reference to the deterrence in the NATO framework in the US National Defense Strategy of 2005, leaves a greater degree of uncertainty about

¹⁶ République Française, Sénat, Audition [de M.me le ministre de la Défense] du 1er février 2006 devant la Commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées.

US intentions in such a crisis. From a political point of view a nuclear threat to Turkey would be a perfect opportunity to revive the Alliance, but again this depends today on contingent political inclinations in Washington than on a firm and clear commitment in advance.

That said, the possibility of a US attack on Iranian suspect facilities would have a high probability to: widen the area of instability; increase Kurdish pressure on Ankara's already complex Middle Eastern strategic theatre and further strain the relationship with the USA and possibly Israel.

4. Opportunities and trade-offs



Turkey: Risks Opportunities Trade-offs

	US defeat	EU integration	Loose EU	Turkey alone	Siloviki Russia	Liberal Russia	Syria	Iraq	Iran	Saudi Arabia	Pakistan
Risks	Strategic vacuum	Strategic tension with the USA	Strategic void also with full EU membership	Relative isolation in the area	Strategic friction with EU and Turkey	Difficult agreements with EU/TR; friction with the USA	Fall of the Alawite rule; possible jihadi or PKK/TAK infiltration	Lebanisation & push for Kurdish independence	Underdeclared NWS. Possible US strike; uncertain US/FR N deterrence	Fall of Saud/disintegration possible invasion	Fall of Musharraf; loose N weapons; strong jihadi influence
Opportunities	Freedom of strategic manoeuvre	Influence in the second global power	More autonomy in the pol-mil area	Freedom of manoeuvre in the area and between powers	Increased development of EU/TR security policy	Stabilisation of Caucasus and Caspian region	Strategic co-operation with Israel over Syria/Lebanon	In five years second evolving democracy at TR borders	Dialogue over Iraq and Caspian sea	Egypt/TR intervention bases	Revelance of TR Democracy experience
Trade offs	Balancing alliances	London-Rome-Ankara "Atlantic bridge trio"	Strategic services strategy	Strained resources for an autonomous regional role	Increase of Turkish strategic value (energy etc)	Increased Turkish strategic projection East and South (Iraq, Iran)	Strategic co-operation with Israel over Syria/Lebanon	Increased Turkish political involvement in assisting transition	Regional, facilitator of EU/Troyka (FR, GE, UK)	Increased Turkish strategic value	Increased Turkish strategic value

Most of the text in these two graphics is self explanatory. The most immediate concerns and policy opportunities are highlighted in medium grey diagonals, because there are the actual scenarios Turkish decision-makers are confronting, i.e. the simultaneous occurring of :

- a US defeat,
- a stalled EU
- a siloviki Russia
- a Lebanised Iraq
- a possible US strike on the background of further talks (black diagonals)

It is interesting to see that in most cases Turkish opportunities and perspectives are relatively good, a mind set that might open the door to the “Turkish alone” scenario, which is the development of the past static heritage “neo-nationalist bastion”. This scenario could have high probabilities to happen if, by the next Autumn 2006, the Cypriot issue would not be considered by Ankara as equitably solved; prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan could decide to freeze or stop the accession process and, exploiting the favourable economic situation, choose an independent Turkish foreign policy path, implying all the possible regional relationships including those regarding the revival of a Central Asiatic shared heritage and those tied to the existence and development of old and new energy networks. An additional internal factor that could influence such a decision is the mounting of neo-nationalist feelings both in the public opinion and in the elite, possibly reinforced by the frustration of the delaying tactics adopted by Germany and Austria in first instance. What the table cannot include is the full appreciation of the risks and costs of this policy vis-à-vis a considerably unstable international environment. Turkey would have to bear fully the costs of this choice with limited contributions by NATO members and probably more generous ones by the USA. In this sense the Iranian scenario hints to a highly risky situation (see supra) entailed by a US or Israeli attack against Iran, in which Turkey is already as if it were alone. The “Turkey alone” policy can be a very attractive option in the short-medium term, but its costs and unknowns are superior than the advantages of a EU membership or of a co-operation that could be closer if break of the accession process does not occur.

Which is precisely what the second graphic “TR opportunities/trade-offs cluster” shows. Despite the present internal and international diffi-

culties that try to stop or slow the accession of Turkey, one can see that in all scenarios (present and future) there is a distinct advantage in an increasing Euro-Turkish co-operation leading to a full membership in a foreseeable future.

In conclusion: Turkey has to struggle in order to keep a fundamentally sound choice (integration in the European Union) against a vanishing regional and international order. The crisis of the UN and the failure of the US unipolar leadership are a difficult background against which the deadlock of the EU is an unpleasant ongoing drama, waiting to be finished by a new national rearrangement around another multinational initiative (an Italo-German for instance is not impossible). Turkey cannot hold to this choice without a process that, albeit long and sometimes painful, has a strong political support at least by a significant constellation of countries in Europe.

In the meantime, the opportunities for a more important Turkish role are increasing and this might lead to the temptation, unfortunately shared also by some old EU members, of a neo-national solution. How much this choice is actually rewarded by reality is on one hand a matter of political decision, but on the other no one can ignore that most times European states have acted outside a strong EU frame they have collected an impressive list of failures (Yugoslav dissolution wars, Great Lakes crisis, Somalia, Congo, third Gulf War) or very limited successes (Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire). In a world where major powers need to have an overall critical mass of power factors and where even a lone superpower has evident limits, Europe is the only sensible choice to give back shared effective sovereignty to nation states who have practically lost the means to act effectively at individual level.

3. TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: A SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

Suhnaz Yilmaz

1. The role of Turkey in Euro-mediterranean Security

The drastic changes that marked the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically altered the strategic calculus of the Western security system. Moreover, the developments in the global scene in the post-September 11 context have further defined the security perceptions of the main actors in the international arena. Thus, the radical change in the source and nature of threats gave way to the emergence of a new European Security architecture and NATO's search for a new role, strategy, and organization compatible with the realities of this new era. While the European Union countries have been successful in achieving a "security community" within Europe, extending this zone of peace and cooperation to the conflict-laden neighboring areas such as the Balkans and the Middle East presents itself as an extremely challenging, if not an impossible task.¹ Since Europe is not immune to the adverse effects of conflicts and deep socio-economic and political problems in the neighboring areas, promoting Euro-Mediterranean security becomes very important for both hard and soft security issues.

¹ For a detailed theoretical discussion of the notion of "Europe as a security community" see Emanuel Adler, ed., *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community," in Beverly Crawford, ed., *The Future of European Security*, Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1992. On the origins of this concept also see Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.

Within this context, this study aims to assess the role of Turkey in Euro-Mediterranean security. This analysis needs to be made at two levels. Hence, in this study, (i) more generally Turkey's perceptions of the security threats in the Mediterranean region and (ii) more specifically Turkey's approach to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) will be critically analyzed.

2. Turkish Perceptions of the Security Threats in the Mediterranean Region

Turkey's perceptions of the Mediterranean have been for a long time dominated by the Cold War mentality. Consequently, in parallel with the US strategic thinking, the Mediterranean was approached in the context of the East-West confrontation and the Middle East conflict. With the emerging gap between the American and European perceptions of the Mediterranean in the post-Cold war era, Turkish concerns shaped by the "hard-security" issues viewing the Mediterranean on an east-west axis rather than a north-south one, has been much closer to the American side. For instance, the Mediterranean is under the surveillance of different regional departments in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Separate divisions focusing on Europe, the Middle East and the Balkans deal with various issues related with this region. Thus, while the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation mainly focuses on the North-South interaction in the Mediterranean, Turkey's strategic thinking has been dominated by the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In this context, the issues that affect Turkey's vital national interests and shape its threat perceptions in this region can be categorized under three groups:

- 1) High Priority Issues for Turkey vital for its Strategic Interests:
 - Future of Iraq
 - Cyprus issue
 - Aegean problems
- 2) Issues of medium-term Interest with Broader Regional and Global Implications:
 - International terrorism
 - Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region
 - Arab-Israeli conflict

3) Issues of Medium and Long-term interest with low-levels of Threat Perception:

- Narcotics and human trafficking
- Energy Politics
- Water Problems

In this respect, the first group, which constitutes the high priority issues vital for Turkey's strategic interests need special emphasis and further elaboration. On the issue of the future of Iraq, regardless of the merits of the disagreement among Turkey, the US, and a number of EU countries concerning the war in Iraq, in its aftermath ensuring a peaceful and stable Iraq is in the interest of all parties concerned. Post-conflict nation-building is an extremely complicated and complex process. While the US succeeded in achieving a swift military victory through its unilateralist approach, winning the peace and creating long-lasting stability will be the real challenge and it requires a multilateralist perspective. As the almost daily attacks on the coalition forces and the wave of terrorist acts indicate, the post-war restructuring of Iraq will indeed be a very difficult task. In tackling this challenge, in addition to genuinely and substantially involving Iraqis themselves in the governing process, a multilateralist approach is essential. Within this context, enhancing collaboration in all dimensions of the Turkey-US-EU triangle will be particularly helpful.²

In the current stage, particularly after the bombing of one of the most revered sites of Shiite Islam, the gold-domed Askariya shrine in Samarra, the already existing tensions between the Sunnites and Shiites have been rapidly escalating and turning into violent sectarian confrontation with a death-toll of at least 138 people within the first few days of the bombing in reprisal attacks and counter-attacks.³ These developments, which significantly curtails the fragile attempts to create a national unity government that could lead Iraq to democratic stability has two critical implications. First, the rapidly escalating sectarian violence sends alarming signals for the possibility of a civil war along sectarian and ethnic lines, which could lead to enormous bloodshed and eventual failure of a united Iraq at the worst case and will certainly

² On the delicate dynamics of these triangular relations see, Ziya Onis and Suhnaz Yilmaz, "The Turkey-EU-US triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?" *Middle East Journal*, vol.59, no.2, Spring 2005, pp. 265-284.

³ "Outrage in Samara," *The New York Times*, February 24, 2006.

make the already arduous task of achieving a democratic, unified and stable Iraq extremely difficult at best. Second, the Shiite-Sunni confrontation in Iraq would also have a destabilizing effect in an already volatile region, particularly in countries like Lebanon and Syria. Moreover, as a result of this confrontation if the Sunnites are marginalized, it would lead to their further radicalization and as an indirect impact it would also further empower the Shiite Iran. Turkey, as a country bordering Iraq sees the developments in Iraq as a vital security concern and tries to get actively involved in the diplomatic arena to reconcile the demands of different groups. Particularly due to Turkey's proximity and its own substantial Kurdish population, possible destabilizing impacts of a civil war in a neighboring country, as well as the possibility of the emergence of an independent Kurdish republic, is viewed with significant concern in Turkey. Hence, Turkey is extremely interested in preserving the stability and the unity of Iraq. In this respect, before developments spiral further in the wrong direction, it is essential that responsible Iraqi leaders from all religious groups try to exert a calming influence. In addition, a multilateral and pro-active diplomatic maneuvering involving not only the US, but the EU and especially regional powers such as Turkey and Egypt would be particularly useful.

Cyprus is another issue of high priority for Turkey, since tackling it is essential towards achieving its goal of EU membership. Yet, at the same time, it is also a highly sensitive domestic issue. Consequently, Turkey needs to pursue a pro-active policy in tackling the Cyprus dispute along the lines of a revived Annan plan. While it had its shortcomings and was not entirely satisfying for both sides, the Annan Plan presented a serious opportunity for the long-lasting Cyprus dispute to be resolved within the European context. Due to the rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriot side, however, as stated by Alvaro de Soto, "A unique and historic chance to resolve the Cyprus problem has been missed."⁴ Greek-Cypriots, nevertheless, hold a strong trump card as a member of the EU. As clearly indicated by the Accession Partnership Report of November 2005, during the course of 2006 the Greek Cypriot pressure on Turkey increased.⁵ By offering asymmetric incentives and by admitting the Greek half of Cyprus as a fully fledged member state, despite its rejec-

⁴ "Exit Poll: Cyprus Reunification Plan to Fail," April 24, 2004, <http://cnn.worldnews.com>.

⁵ Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Decision On the Principles, Priorities, and Conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey, Brussels, 9 November, 2005, COM (2005), 559.

tion of the unification plan, the EU found itself importing an old conflict. To the dismay of Brussels, the fortified Green Line dividing the two parts of Cyprus has now become an external EU border. In the difficult path towards reaching a sustainable solution to the Cyprus problem within the EU context, the UN and the US also has a critical role to play as a balancing factor.

Moreover, the long lasting tensions in the Aegean among Turkey and Greece on bilateral disputes regarding territorial waters, continental-shelf, airspace, militarization of the eastern Greek islands, flight information region, and the presence of highly contended “grey areas” due to lack of clear demarcation, further complicate the picture.⁶ In order to become a full-member of the EU, Turkey also needs to resolve these bilateral problems with Greece, in addition to the Cyprus problem. So, while currently there is no imminent threat of military confrontation neither with the Greek Cypriots, nor with Greeks, the significance of the above-mentioned issues for Turkey’s EU membership, enhances the priority of the resolution of these problems for Turkey.

The issues in the second and third categories also have significant importance for Turkey, as well as having broader regional and global implications, especially in the medium and long-term. In addition to the threat from transnational and domestic terrorist networks, the Iranian attempts towards acquiring nuclear technology to develop weapons of mass destruction are particularly troublesome for Turkey. For instance, these concerns gave impetus to a recent initiative by the Turkish military to procure anti-ballistic missiles.

As for the Turkish perception of regional initiatives, while Turkey was an affiliate of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), it was a rather reluctant partner from the very beginning. The Turkish stance has been primarily due to its anxiety over the fact that Turkey would be confined to the position of a peripheral southern country inside the EMP. Turkish leaders emphasized that EMP could not be an alternative to Turkey as a

⁶ For a discussion of basic areas of major dispute, see Süha Bölükbaşı, “The Turco-Greek Dispute: Issues, Policies, and Prospects,” in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*, Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1992, pp. 28-51; Panayotis, J. Tsakonas and Thanos Dakos, “Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century,” in Leonore Martin and Dimitris Keridis, (eds.), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004, pp. 101-125. For a Greek perspective on the Aegean Problems, also see Theodore Couloumbis and Kostas Infantis, “Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic Options and Structural Constraints- A realist Approach,” *Review of International Affairs*, vol.2, no.2, winter 2002, pp.1-25.

critical actor for Euro-Mediterranean security. While Turkey has a rather limited engagement within the EMP framework, it also strongly favors cooperation on soft security issues, particularly on combating international terrorism and illegal immigration and drug trafficking. Moreover, with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Turkey's significance regarding energy politics as a critical transit route has been enhanced and due to its upstream position in the Euphrates and Tigris basin Turkey is already an influential player in the water politics of the region. As indicated by its response to the Iraqi crisis and the previous conflicts in the Balkans and to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Turkey also promotes a multilateral approach in dealing with regional conflicts.

3. Turkish Approach to the ESDP

After achieving considerable economic and political strength through the European integration within the framework of the European Union, NATO's European allies are trying to reduce their dependence on the United States for their security and defense. This goal was manifested in the European Union's efforts to create a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) that targets the emergence of an EU military capability complementary to, but autonomous from, NATO. European countries are aiming to achieve greater political authority and operational control, which would lead to a more equitable sharing of power and responsibilities. In describing the European perspective, a German diplomat said, "We are not asking for a free lunch. We will help pay for the lunch." ⁷ However, we also intend to have more say in ordering the lunch." ⁷ France has taken the lead in this attempt to end American hegemony over the security affairs of Europe, and it vehemently expresses the need to counterbalance US primacy in a unipolar world. France was joined in its demands first by Germany and then by Britain. In 1998, the British took an unprecedented step in support of its EU partners arguing that it is essential for Europe to develop its own military capability. The United States has been rather suspicious of this process and remains reluctant to diminish its influence in transatlantic security arrangements and decision making. The major U.S. concern is over the development of an independent European Security system, as envisioned by France,

⁷ Charles Barry, S. Kay, and J. Spero, "Completing the Transatlantic Bargain: The United States and European Security" *Current History*, March 2001, p.130.

which could undermine NATO. Moreover, given the constraints on the defense budgets of European countries, the United States remains doubtful whether the European defense capabilities would be able to match NATO and EU military goals of deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility, survivability, and lethality. The new European security architecture would require larger national defense budgets, as well as more collaborative European investment in defense. One important issue, which affects the future of the Euro-Mediterranean security, has been the Turkish approach to ESDP. In the finalization process of the ESDP, Turkey has been very reluctant to give up the rights that it has acquired within the WEU framework. The goal of providing a security and defense mechanism for Europe resulted in the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1948. However, with the establishment of NATO, it was sidelined and the United States became the dominant actor shaping the transatlantic security relations in the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, the WEU, which was revived in 1984, gave impetus to its efforts to forge a "European identity" for security and defense. Since the mid-1990s the WEU has gone through a significant institutional growth. With the inclusion of Greece in 1995, its membership grew to ten. In addition to these full members of the WEU, which were also members of NATO and the EU, the WEU had six associate members: Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. These countries were members of NATO, but were not a part of the European Union. The WEU also had five "observers" (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) that are EU members, which for political reasons have preferred a limited engagement. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, ten more Eastern European and Baltic countries became affiliated with the WEU as "associate partners" in 1994.

The WEU's goal of achieving collective defense and security through collaboration with NATO was complemented by the so-called Petersberg tasks. According to a 1992 EU decision, these crucial tasks included humanitarian and rescue missions, crisis management, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement in areas endangering European security. The major weakness of the WEU was that, due to its very limited political power and operational capabilities, it was heavily dependent on US decisions and military assets to conduct large-scale operations. Particularly in terms of secure communications, data transfer technologies, precision all-weather capabilities, logistical and intelligence expertise, the United States has a superiority over its allies. The war in Kosovo,

during which the United States had to conduct the two-thirds of the high precision operations by itself, was a clear indicator of European weaknesses at the strategic operational level.⁸

In 1999, when the EU decided to take over the WEU, it also set an ambitious goal of constituting a rapid reaction force of up to 60,000 troops by 2003. These forces would be available for deployment within sixty days and would remain in the crisis areas for at least one year in order to implement the Petersberg tasks. After assessing its force requirements through close interaction with NATO during the EU meeting in November 2000, the start up plans for the EU force were determined. Accordingly, the EU decided to create a pool of 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft, and 100 ships to be used for the rapid reaction force. One of the most controversial and sensitive issues for Turkey during this process was the redefinition of the future role of the non-EU members of NATO within the new ESDP framework.

During the Cold War strategic confrontation, Turkey served as a pivotal actor in NATO's Southeastern flank. Turkey retains its strong interest in European Security arrangements and in ensuring itself a continuing pre-eminent role in NATO as a Southern Region country. Unlike the other EU member countries of this region (namely Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece), Turkey had a high stake in maintaining the institutional status quo, especially since the ESDP excludes Turkey from its decision-making mechanisms.

In strategic terms, an important implication of ESDP is that the EU member countries of the Southern Region, despite the recent differences over Iraq, try to converge their positions with the European mainstream in general. Hence, they are more reluctant to take positions which would be at variance with the other European countries. This might lead to further divergence on defense cooperation issues with the United States. On the other hand, due to its isolation regarding European security and defense issues, Turkey seeks closer cooperation with the US and Israel. This dilemma actually put Turkey into a rather difficult position during the Iraq war, since its stance was more closely aligned with the core European one as propagated by France and Germany.

As an associate member of the WEU, Turkey enjoyed participation in important WEU activities including participation in the bi-weekly meet-

⁸ Hasan Köni, "Avrupa Savunması, ABD, ve Türkiye" *Savunma ve Havacılık*, vol.14, no.82, June 2000, p. 73.

ings of twenty-eight ambassadors, having five officers on duty in the defense planning cell, and representation by the Turkish parliamentarians during the bi-annual meetings of the WEU Assembly. Although Turkey was excluded from decision-making in the WEU Council and from collective defense close of the WEU treaty, a compromise was reached for the activities of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). When the utilization of NATO assets were required by the CJTFs, Turkey would have the right to fully participate in the WEU decision-making.⁹ Moreover, the problem of the status of the WEU during a possible military conflict between Turkey and Greece was resolved by the decision that the collective defense clause would not be applicable in conflicts between NATO members.¹⁰

During the Washington NATO Summit in April 1999, the Strategic Concept (defining NATO goals and strategies) was updated in order to “equip the alliance for the security challenges and opportunities of the 21st century and to guide its future political and military development.”¹¹ Within this context, Turkey reiterated the necessity of its agreement for any decision of the NATO Council regarding the use of alliance assets for European purposes. Consequently, the Turks enforced a revision in the formulation of NATO’s New Strategic Concept, in which this right is implicitly expressed by reference to a case-by-case basis for alliance decisions. Accordingly, “arrangements for the release, monitoring, and return or recall of NATO assets and capabilities” were to be “made available, on a case-by-case basis to support WEU-led operations.”¹² Moreover, NATO-EU relations were to be structured around already existing mechanisms between NATO and the WEU.

During the December 2000 Nice Summit of the EU, the changes in EU decisions vis-a-vis the Washington Summit of 1999 caused a major disappointment for Ankara. Not only were there no references to shaping the new security and defense strategies according to the previous mechanisms of the WEU, but also the non-EU members of NATO had been totally excluded from the decision-making structures. In 1995, the WEU Council of Ministers had decided that in case of a complete integration of the WEU into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), “the

⁹ “WEU Accepts Turkey in Decision-Making” *Turkish Daily News*, April 16, 1997.

¹⁰ Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States*, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1999, p.217.

¹¹ *Report of the NATO Summit in Washington*, 23-25 April, 1999.

¹² *Ibid.*

participation of associate members in the further development of the ESDP would have to be maintained and even improved vis-à-vis their present status through appropriate arrangements to ensure their involvement and association with the CFSP.”¹³ However, due to the Union’s categorical refusal to allow the non-members to participate in its decision-making process, even on a partial basis, how such a goal could be achieved is unclear. Consequently, Ankara argued that non-EU members of NATO should not automatically be expected to comply with political decisions that have been taken without their participation.

Among the WEU associate member countries, Turkey has been the country most adversely affected by this restructuring process. Turkey is located in a very volatile area. According to the reports of the French Defense Institute and the International Strategy Institute in Switzerland, Turkey is surrounded by thirteen of the sixteen “hot spots” (i.e. Kosovo, Syria, Cyprus, Chechnya), which are prone to the outbreak of conflicts that could affect European security.¹⁴ Being quite distant to the hot spots, Norway agreed to participate just in the decision-shaping mechanisms. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic also went along with the EU decision since they were to acquire their full-membership status in the EU in the near future. The fact that these former Warsaw pact countries were granted European Union membership before Turkey and would get more influence in European security affairs than a long-standing NATO ally, has been also rather exasperating for the Turks. In the end, Ankara’s adamant insistence “led to a collapse of the NATO consensus on command sharing and planning arrangements with the EU in December 2000.”¹⁵

Turkish concerns were expressed by Admiral Nahit Senogul as “(1) danger of the recent EU initiative to undermine the impact of NATO and the Transatlantic link and to erode NATO’s deterrence power; and (2) the possibility of EU-initiated operations and other activities to adversely affect Turkey’s security.”¹⁶ Within this framework, Turkey was particularly concerned over the possibility that in case of escalating tensions in the Aegean or in Cyprus, intense pressure from Greece may result in a

¹³ Assembly of the Western European Union, *Organizing Security in Europe: Political Aspects, Document 1509* (Brussels, 1996), p.42.

¹⁴ “Turkiye’nin Cevresi Atesten Gomlek” *Cumhuriyet*, 17 December, 2000.

¹⁵ Charles Barry, S. Kay, and J. Spero, “Completing the Transatlantic Bargain,” p.135.

¹⁶ Nahit Senogul, “AGSK, AB ve NATO Iliskilerinin Gelecegi ve Turkiye’ye Etkileri,” *Savunma ve Havacilik*, vol.14, no.82, June 2000, p. 70.

confrontation between the European Rapid Reaction Force and Turkey. Consequently, to achieve a viable compromise, Turkey had to be assured that such a scenario would be avoided. Turks argued that as the EU defense policy takes its final shape, giving non-EU NATO countries “an opportunity to clarify and to decide on a case-by-case basis how they interpret the collective defense implications of the NATO treaty for EU-led security operations” became essential.

The long-lasting deadlock between Turkey and Greece served as a stumbling block for the ESDP. This deadlock was finally resolved through a compromise during the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. The Council decided that “the ‘Berlin plus’ agreements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU member states which are also either NATO members or parties to the ‘Partnership for Peace,’ and which have consequently concluded bilateral security arrangements with NATO.”¹⁷ Thus, by excluding Cyprus and Malta from EU military operations conducted using NATO assets, a breakthrough was achieved in providing EU access to NATO capacities and assets. The Union will now be permitted to utilize NATO logistics and have access to the NATO planning base SHAPE. NATO secretary General Lord Robertson underlined the importance of this breakthrough by stating, “This is a milestone in the history of relations between NATO and the EU.”¹⁸

This development serves as a critical turning point for ESDP, which will enable the Union to have a stronger capacity for crisis management and will also contribute significantly to the enhancement of cooperation regarding Euro-Mediterranean security. In this respect, Turkey has already played an active role in all EU led peace-keeping operations since 2003, with the exception of Congo. Thus, Turkey has significantly contributed to the multinational efforts of peacekeeping in the Balkans, Somalia, and most recently in Afghanistan. For instance, in 1995 Turkey has joined UNPROFOR with 1450 troops. Moreover, it participated to the NATO’s IFOR and SFOR with 1200 troops and also contributes to police operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. In addition to these, in June 2002 Turkey has assumed the command of NATO forces in Afghanistan, namely ISAF (International Security and Assistance Force), for nine months and resumed their command once again in 2005.

Turkey has a critical role to play for the enhancement of peace and sta-

¹⁷ “Declaration of the Council Meeting in Copenhagen on 12 December 2002,” Presidency Conclusions, Annex II, Copenhagen, 12-13 December, 2002.

¹⁸ “NATO and EU sign Historic Partnership Agreement,” EU Observer, 17 December, 2002.

bility in its volatile region as a pivotal regional power with substantial military capabilities. However, it can play a more constructive and effective role, as a benign rather than a coercive power, if it successfully fulfills four challenging tasks by (1) consolidating its democracy; (2) maintaining good neighborly relations; (3) achieving a balance in its troublesome EU-Turkey-US triangle and (4) operating within a European framework. Turkey's role in the Euro-Mediterranean security is clearly defined by its long-lasting relations within the Transatlantic context and its goal of EU membership. On both fronts, Turkey has a challenging period ahead, during which it needs to overcome numerous domestic and international obstacles.

4. Concluding Remarks

In the post-Cold war period, there a number of emerging security and cooperation mechanisms in the Mediterranean particularly within the NATO and the EU framework. It is crucial that there is a high degree of coordination and complementarity among them, which is currently lacking. Moreover, for a security arrangement that would enhance Western security without causing major fault-lines in the NATO alliance, EU operational objectives and strategic goals also need to take into account the aims, contributions, and strategic significance of the non-EU participants. Turkey has clearly indicated through its contributions during the conflicts in the Balkans and in Afghanistan that it has a great potential to contribute to the military and non-military missions. In that respect, Turkish membership to the EU could serve as a great asset for the ESDP framework. For instance, in a volatile area like the Balkans (where Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia have become hot spots) Turkey plays a significant role in peacemaking and peacekeeping operations. Within this framework, in the future a Turkish-Greek-Italian collaborative effort supported by the ESDP and NATO might serve as the driving force for the establishment of a long-lasting peace in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.

As for more specific policy recommendations relating to Turkey:

1) There has to be an early start and significant investment on technical cooperation on bringing Turkey up to Schengen standards in border controls. Since Turkey has quite porous and long borders adjacent to

conflict zones, securing these borders will also significantly curtail illegal migration and narcotics trafficking.

2) There can be enhanced collaboration with Turkey on further peace-keeping and police training missions in the Balkans.

3) Turkey, which traditionally relies more heavily on the US and Israeli for its armaments procurements, could more actively cooperate with the leading countries of the EU in the field of armaments collaboration.

4) On important diplomatic issues concerning neighboring regions, such as Iraq and the Caucasus, Turkey and the EU countries can align their positions more closely. Moreover, on culturally and religiously sensitive issues concerning the Muslim world, such as the most recent cartoon controversy more specifically, but regarding the status of Euro-Muslims and Christian-Muslim dialogue in general, Turkey could play an active role in facilitating the channels of dialogue.

5) While the issues of high security, such as Arab-Israeli conflict and developments in Iraq, dominate the Euro-Mediterranean agenda, economic development and human development through education are essential for achieving a more peaceful region, as well as for preventing important problems such as illegal immigration, which ranks high on the European agenda. So far, the Barcelona process, while facilitating bi-lateral links between the EU and individual countries with varying degrees of success, have fallen short of achieving regional networks of cooperation and dialogue through establishing stronger ties and deeper understanding among regional powers. This is one area that needs further attention. In this respect, there can be an intensified track-two diplomacy among regional actors and the EU, increased civil society interaction, and regular (and sometimes emergency meetings) among regional leaders and the EU representatives assessing critical issues concerning high and low security issues in the Euro-Med region. In this context, Turkey, Italy and Greece has the potential to act as pivotal countries facilitating channels of dialogue and cooperation initiatives among different parties.

6) Finally, there can be an accelerated process of Second Pillar integration for Turkey within the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, it should be made very clear to all parties that this would not lead to any kind of a privileged partnership status for Turkey and would in no way endanger its full-membership prospects. On the contrary, it can serve as a critical stepping stone highlighting the common interests and critical collaboration areas for both parties.

The developments concerning Turkey's integration to the Union have also important repercussions for the Cyprus issue and Turkish-Greek disputes over the Aegean, as well as Turkey's role in the Euro-Mediterranean security. European powers require a politically and economically stable neighborhood to supplement their security architecture. By excluding Turkey they would be missing a major pillar in building this edifice, thus dooming it to collapse. For the enhancement of European security, Mediterranean cooperation, and bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece, Turkey's integration to the Union play a critical role. However, despite the initiation of the accession negotiation process on October 3, 2005, the prospects of Turkish membership and the path ahead still seem ambiguous and complicated. Moreover, the deepening transatlantic rift in the aftermath of the Iraq war places Turkey in an even more difficult situation. Hence, both the transatlantic and the EU fault-lines constitute a major challenge for Turkey.

The *European Security Strategy* concludes that, "This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realize opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world."¹⁹ However, the recent developments, marked by the uncertain future of the European constitution, coupled by the dynamics of latest wave of enlargement, signal an alarming halt to the momentum towards an "ever loser Union." These factors will also make the consensus towards a common foreign and security policy more difficult. Consequently, the EU needs a serious introspection as to how to shape the future of the Europe Union and the result of this pain-staking process will not only determine the future of Turkey-EU relations and the Mediterranean security, but also the very success of the European project.

¹⁹ Javier Solana, "A Secure Europe in a Better World," *European Security Strategy*, Brussels, December 2003, p.14.

4. A STRATEGIC APPROACH

Giovanni Gasparini and Stefano Silvestri

1. Introduction

Turkey's EU accession could be seen both as a plus or a minus for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). As a plus, because it will bring in an important military presence and a significant geo-strategic role; as a minus because it will enlarge the European common borders to touch some very troubled areas like the Caucasus and the Middle East. Both sides of this dilemma are well represented in the political and academic ongoing discussion in Europe.

A recent report by Erich Reiter and the Austrian Institute for European Security Policy for the Austrian MoD, stresses some of the negative points:

"Turkey has, among others, borders with Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq and Syria (...) the relations with these countries are definitely problematic and inherit considerable conflict"

Turkey's location would give the European Union a "front-state character in the world's largest crisis region". Further Turkey has a "natural rivalry" with Russia for influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which are the "back door" of Russia.

As far as military capabilities are concerned, "What Europeans lack in modern equipment and strategic capacities, Turkey cannot deliver (...) so, it does bring a substantial strengthening, but only quantitative increases in areas where it is not necessary."

In fact, this kind of negative assessment stems largely from a “worst case” projection of Turkey’s international and security policies in the years ahead, and do not take into account the significant evolution of the ESDP itself. For instance, it would be disingenuous to think that the EU, without Turkey, could isolate itself from the Middle Eastern crises. Nor can it be said that Europe’s necessary military modernization could be negatively influenced by Turkey.

Yet it is also clear that Turkey’s role in Europe and its EU accession could greatly benefit from an increased strategic and military convergence.

Any serious scenario exercise over the possible degrees of convergence or divergence should carefully take into account the mutual reforms that the EU and Turkey are expected to undertake in the next 10 to 15 years and that, if carried out, would significantly modify their capabilities: more expeditionary oriented those of the European and technologically more up to date those of Turkey, thus allowing for easier cooperation (especially if Turkey will in fact take part in the European battle group program, as is already envisaged, and if the NATO Response Forces will eventually integrate in the overall common European defence framework).

This however will be influenced by the fast changing international environment (global and regional). Therefore, the convergence exercise is complicated by the fact that we are considering two moving targets and try to establish some policy recommendations aiming at their convergence in the mid term.

Our perspective is that, notwithstanding the different political, economic and social considerations, concerns and judgments over the accession process, there is a reciprocal political responsibility to make Turkey ready for EU and the EU ready for Turkey. This is particularly true as far as the security relationship is concerned, since both players are better off when they enter a cooperative game than as lonely actors at the border of the European area of stability.

While the final outcome of the process of Turkey’s accession remains largely uncertain, and security and defence considerations will probably not be at the very top of the agenda in the mind of the European decision makers, we would argue that the security aspect of these bilateral relations is too important to remain neglected.

Regarding its neighbours, Turkey has some delicate questions to address which will undoubtedly be part of the negotiations with the EU. Difficult border relations with Georgia and especially Armenia, the conflicts arising with Iraq and Syria over the management of the Tigris and

Euphrates waters, ethnic and minority problems in common with those countries, etc. will have to be confronted to diminish the likelihood of open conflict. Both the Aegean and the Northern Cyprus questions require further attention and decisions. Yet, the need to confront these open problems should be seen as an opportunity to intervene positively in a conflict ridden region, to diminish and manage tensions, and not as an obstacle blocking the path of Turkey's accession to the EU.

At the same time, as far as the EU is concerned, fully integrating Turkey in the ESDP would need a simplification of the decision-making process and would probably determine an increased attention to the Middle East and the Caucasus, as much as the entrance of a number of "Eastern" countries is already influencing EU relations with Russia.

On the Turkish side, the decision makers will be required to plug into the European logic of shared sovereignty, as well as embarking on a structural process of reform and modernisation of the military and security forces that should take into account the choices that are made by the Europeans, both in operational and in technological terms.

This is a particularly delicate question because the existing NATO framework, in which Turkey is of course fully integrated, may not be strong and comprehensive enough to give the necessary political, strategic and technological guidance. It is quite clear already that the innovative decisions taken by the Istanbul Summit of 2004 on NATO transformation are not being implemented or are watered down, as it is happening to the so-called "Comprehensive Political Guidance" document or has already happened to the structural reform proposals put forward by the Secretary General with the document prepared by the Danish diplomat Jasper Vahr.

Important challenges may further complicate the smooth and effective working of the Alliance. This is certainly the case of the "global partnership" idea put on the table by the United States, which would further enlarge the already cumbersome and somewhat uncoordinated system of commitments and initiatives taken under the badly defined umbrella of "partnership policies". Complexity may eventually lead to contradictions and to misuse of scarce resources, obliging NATO to choose between, for example, further investments in Eastern Europe or in the Middle East, in Northern Europe or in the Mediterranean, in technological modernization or in peace-keeping and state-building operations, in security or in hard defence, and so on and so forth. It could also lead to unpalatable political choices such as engagement on the side of less than democratic countries. At the same the American global partnership

agenda could provoke new transatlantic tensions, similar to those created by the decision to go to war against Iraq, depending on how far is pushed and which objectives put forward. This is already apparent in the somewhat different approach taken by Washington and by a majority of the European allies on the question of a further rapid enlargement of NATO, including the three Balkan candidates already on the table (Albania, Croatia and the FYROM) but especially if reaching Ukraine and Georgia.

All these reasons point to a possible weakening of the Atlantic framework leaving both Turkey and the other European allies with some difficult choices to make. It would be important if the two would not find themselves on different sides. At the same time, the traditional consensus making and guidance role of NATO on strategic and military affairs could be significantly impaired by the difficulty of devising and implementing a coherent, significant and forward looking set of decisions, thus leaving each country with a greater range of possible options.

2. Strategic Framework

The existing European “visions” of Turkey’s strategic region are influenced by many different (sometime conflicting) perceptions such as the relationship with Russia, the Balkans or the Middle East, energy policy, active military role in the area, control of illegal immigration and criminality, etcetera.

Some “classical” (territorial, state to state) threats remain in place, in particular as far as the Eastern border of Turkey is concerned; the Middle East neighbourhood is far from being stabilised and will ask for a special attention also in terms of balance of power in the future. The participation in NATO is already a strong guarantee, but the difficulties encountered in the activation process according to Article 4, right before the US military operations against Iraq in 2003, suggest that political divergence at the transatlantic level can deliver unexpected damage and lower the credibility of collective defence.

Also, recent trends in WMD and missile proliferation underline the basic fact that Turkey, like other European countries, but in greater and earlier danger, is not immune from airborne and missile threats and would have to secure its long maritime and land border, as well as the national airspace, from both new military and asymmetrical threats, in particular the recrudescence of international terrorism; while Turkey

takes part in most international military operations against terrorist organisation, it lacks participation in the framework for deeper cooperation established in the EU (even if it has joined the Europeans in the acceptance of some common declarations on these matters).

The European Union seems even better placed than NATO, as an institution, to deal with the kind of problems that require a collective and cooperative answer that cannot be of a purely military nature. The European attitude of protecting its citizens with an holistic approach that complements national military means with cooperative efforts in the field of civil protection, police management and intelligence is certainly in line with Turkish domestic as well as international needs, and should be used as the basis for further initiatives.

The development of the EU Neighborhood Policy will certainly increase the European interest and commitment in the region. Given the very great (and growing) interests of the European countries in the Turkish strategic region, it is unlikely that the “demands” that the EU will make on Turkey will be of a similar nature of the “demands” made in the past by the United States, and that the EU will simply be concerned with the access to the Turkish territory and the availability of some military bases. On the contrary, it is more likely that the EU will try to involve Turkey in its long term planning and actions of all nature (diplomatic, political, economical, as well as in the security and military spheres) towards the “Wider Middle East”, taking advantage of the Turkish “card” to better fulfill its strategic and political aims. Thus, it seems likely that, should the accession process continue in a positive way, the EU will make far greater and deeper “demands” on Turkey than those made in the past by the Atlantic Alliance. This is a perspective that may put Turkey under relatively high political pressure, and that should be carefully prepared in advance and well managed, to avoid backlash.

During this process, the EU and Turkey will be confronted with a parallel analysis of their respective visions, to consider their similarities and differences. The main problem will be to see if and how a process of convergence could be established, where the main obstacles will lie (probably with Russia, some Caucasus questions, Cyprus, the relationship with the Islamic world, etc.) and what should be done to overcome them.

An interesting question to explore is the development of the European approach to homeland defense, counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, and how it could affect its perceptions of Turkey’s role and importance. In the end the answer will largely depend on the number and importance of cooperation initiatives that will have been successfully

undertaken by both Turkey and the EU. In other words, it would be highly unwise to make these initiatives dependent on the successful outcome of the negotiating process, while the contrary approach should be taken, of influencing the negotiations through the multiplication of initiatives. Of course, in order to that, an attitude favorable to a convergence of goodwill and openness should prevail inside the EU as well, and not only on the Turkish side.

The political and institutional context in which the convergence process will take place is of paramount importance and will largely determine the final result.

A central issue would be the real and perceived development of transatlantic relations. The Iraqi crisis has strained the relationship between Turkey and the US, and the continuation of war and unrest in Iraq has led to the death of many Turkish nationals as well as significant economic losses. The Turkish political and military elite, as well as the general public (see the Transatlantic Trends poll results), has perceived the US policy in the area as somehow diverging from their general and specific national interests, and Turkey as losing its grip and its influence over its major ally. The increased interest in the European process is also partially due to the perceived partial American disengagement from NATO, in favour of a coalition of the willing and able approach. Although recently the favour for the EU has diminished, partially due to the internal European problems generated by the failure of the Constitutional process and the negative approach of France and even Germany to EU enlargement, the European Union is still perceived as a vital complementary (if not alternative) institution to NATO, that has been so far the main driver of Turkish security policy.

The main problems stem from the rigid negotiating stance adopted by Ankara on NATO/EU cooperation, up to the successful agreement on the implementation of the so called Berlin Plus arrangements, at the end of 2002. Since then, Turkey has in fact taken part in almost all EU operations, from the police mission in Bosnia (EUPM) to Macedonia (Proxima), Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa), Concordia (again in Macedonia) and Althea, substituting SFOR in Bosnia. To these engagements we should add Turkey's participation to NATO missions such as KFOR (in Kosovo) and ISAF in Afghanistan. Moreover Ankara gives military assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan and takes part in the naval operations Active Endeavour (in the Mediterranean) and Harmony (in the Black Sea). Yet, problems are bound to surface again, until the Northern Cyprus question will not be successfully solved or put aside (downgraded) by the Turkish government.

Participation in ESDP does not only guarantee Turkey from being excluded from possible operations having an impact on its interests; it also provides a supplementary solidarity network in case of crisis outside NATO interests, or, more to the point, whenever new problems will arise between Ankara and Washington, but it has also a value of its own as a significant way to increase Turkey's relevance for Europe and to avoid marginalization on issues and decision of great importance for the country. The main problem is that this cooperation, while large and repeated, still is based on ad hoc arrangements, on a case by case basis, and that Turkey is limited at holding only the receiving end, being asked to join operations already agreed upon in principle inside the EU, and never being able to put on the table its own proposals, because it is not yet a full member. The fact is that ESDP is very much a tool of CFSP, and that Turkey is only associated with the former, but not with the latter (at least not in the same way).

These limitations, however, diminish the overall political and strategic value of the Turkish association with ESDP, making it largely unwise (and difficult) for Ankara to re-balance its military and defence policies in favour of Europe only on the basis of ad hoc cooperation initiatives. Militarily, the ESDP will become only with great difficulty become a new point of reference for planning and restructuring the future of Turkish Armed Forces, unless a more significant and stable linkage is created, starting with CFSP machinery and policies. A special partnership mechanism linking Turkey to CFSP/ESDP should be established now, which would be simply an anticipation of full membership rights in case of a successful outcome, but which should be conceived as remaining in place anyway even if the negotiations fail or are further prolonged.

3. Military Convergence

A degree of military convergence between European and Turkish armies is already present, thanks to Turkey's longstanding experience in NATO, yet it is clearly insufficient. Moreover, future convergence will largely depend on European choices as well: what kind of military-industrial relationship, what kind of operational choices will be made in the framework of ESDP? The work initiated by the European Defense Agency is somewhat different (even if not at odds with) the work being done by the new NATO Transformation Command. A number of decisions will have to be taken, not only on the basis of the best available

military technologies, but also stemming from the “model” of military operations that the Europeans are asked to perform, from industrial considerations (especially those having clear security consequences, as on technology transfers), from economic priorities etcetera. It is unlikely that the American warfare model will be simply accepted and copied by the Europeans as a whole, even if it will certainly remain the unavoidable term of reference and if a large degree of operational interoperability would have to be maintained.

Turkey is in a relatively good position because it is starting now a period of renewal of its key military equipments. Thus, it is a good moment to discuss the strategic and operational rationale of its various possible choices, and the possibility and desirability of a greater convergence between Turkish and European choices.

A process of military reform seems inevitable even without the incentive given by the future accession to the EU. Of course the presence of this opportunity would clearly have a strong impact on the direction of the renewal process. Simply looking at the list of common goals with possible security and military implications is significant:

- A fight against international terrorism of radical Islamic roots;
- The promotion of non proliferation regimes and policies, in particular towards Iran;
- The stabilization of the Mediterranean and Middle East;
- The solution of the Israeli-Palestine dispute;
- The stabilization of a unified Iraq;
- The deterrence of possible state-to-state conflicts and border dispute;
- The cooperation of military and security forces for civil protection against man-made and natural catastrophes.

Moreover, Turkey remains a central player for the evolution of the relationship between NATO and the EU, for both good and ill. The ongoing dispute over Cyprus is significant to this end, but the solution of this quarrel can be managed over a relatively long term (before the actual accession will take place) provided that it is not transformed unwisely, by the EU or by Turkey, as an obstacle to continuing negotiations altogether.

A significant factor to be considered is the emergence of a new way of producing security, both at the European and transatlantic level, that is characterised by a shift from labour intensive forces to stronger investment in capital. Turkey has a large conscript force, something that is becoming a rare exception in Europe and that it may have some utility, especially for security oriented scenarios, needing large numbers for protection and control of the territory. Yet Turkey is also considering a sub-

stantial recapitalisation of its defence forces that should at the same time shrink the large human contribution. This country, while maintaining some traditional features of its defence model, is trying to increase the technological content of the military, to be able to plug in and contribute actively to the NATO and the ESDP models of rapid reaction and stabilisation forces, requiring a high level of systems interoperability and personnel training. The participation in these endeavours will somewhat condition and direct the change; a large amount of “double-hatting” of the best units is to be considered as a probable outcome, together with an increased focus on the deployability of those forces in joint and combined contexts, ranging from small and relatively risk-free stabilisation mission to more demanding combat operations against large enemy forces. Turkey therefore will reinforce NATO and ESDP capabilities, while making its military forces ready to satisfy the commitments coming from both entities.

The increased level of interoperability and deployability will drive requirements and help to prioritize the allocation of resources, that could be strained by the simultaneous starting of a number of procurement processes, as well as by uncertainties in the economic and political outlook. The most likely requirements would be in the category of air and sea-based deployment of mid-sized ground forces, protection of soldiers in missions outside the national borders, training systems for all kind of operators, etcetera. The need to participate in international endeavors or coalitions with the European and American allies will push for an increased interest for C4ISR systems and generally speaking network enablers.

To facilitate this process and to better link Turkey with the European defense policy, however, the need arises to immediately establish a strong link between Turkey and the European Defense Agency, possibly even considering the possibility of making Turkey a full member of it, even before or without Turkish membership of the EU, so that the Agency will be allowed to manage cooperative procurement and modernization programs with this country, starting as soon as possible, when the Turkish Government has not yet fully made up its mind on what should be done.

Increasing the strategic and military convergence between Turkey and the EU would reduce greatly the possibility of a negative assessment about Turkey’s European membership, and would at the same time help establishing a favorable climate. Yet, to achieve real convergence will not be an easy process and should not be considered with complacency.

4. Defence Industrial Cooperation

The needs and requirements identified above will translate into the procurement of a number of systems, platforms and sensors, hardware and software. Therefore, the model of defence chosen and the institutional framework in which it will evolve will have a decisive impact not only from the political and operational point of view, but will also open or close a relevant number of opportunities for the development or disappearance of the local defence industrial base. The consequences would not be limited to economic and technical development: the participation in European procurement programs as a stakeholder guarantees a significant improvement in the operational capability and long term reliability of the military forces.

Given the pattern of Turkish international engagements, the prominence of interoperability factors should drive the choice of Turkey towards a two-tracks strategy in which the traditional link with the United States (in particular off-the-shelf acquisitions) could be increasingly complemented and sometimes replaced by growing participation in European wide programs, provided that greater attention is given to specific Turkish priorities and requirements, both for the growth of defence industrial base and for the satisfaction of military requirements. The strongest point would probably be the industrial one, especially given the complex and rigid American system which regulate technology transfers. Moreover, a European perspective will mean for the Turkish defence industry to enter a market which rules are currently subject to a fierce discussion among current member states. It would be certainly better to contribute to shape reforms than become a pure policy taker, as far as the complex dynamic interaction between supply and demand side of this imperfect market is concerned.

The Turkish defence industry has already developed a significant overall experience in most areas and could offer significant niche capabilities to the European partners, whose dimension is certainly larger, but significantly less dominant than the American counterpart. A progressive opening to European partners could mean more opportunities for technological development, in a time when the US attitude towards technological transfer seems particularly awkward and restrictive, as it has been recently experienced in the JSF case. Moreover, this will translate into better operational control. Finally, the political linkages to the EU would stimulate the ongoing industry move from traditional off-the-shelf US buys to cooperative production schemes.

5. EU - TURKEY MILITARY CONVERGENCE

Şadi Ergüvenç

Security has been central in uniting the nations of Europe. A common market where people, goods and services can move freely, where an *acqui communautaire* based on common values can build up, ultimately leading to a constitution for Europe were all the essential elements of a vision for a conflict free, peaceful Europe. The European Union has become a war proof region even without a common defense, without achieving full convergence on security and defense issues. Not all EU members had been WEU members; a number of the EU members are still not interested in NATO membership. The *constitution* to be adopted calls only for *enhanced cooperation* amongst the EU members rather than a firm commitment for the common defense, thereby failing to supersede *the Brussels Treaty*. Indeed, in Europe, defense *per se* is still considered primarily as a national issue and defense sales and procurement have been kept exempt from the market rules to a very large extent.¹ The force that is being established is not for collective defense but for the *Petersberg tasks*. Disagreements and disparities amongst the EU member nations prevail over transatlantic relations, military requirements and priorities as well as capabilities and in responding to issues such as Iraq whilst they easily concede on the indivisibility of

¹ For a detailed analysis of European armaments co-operation see Chaillot Paper No: 59, "European Armaments Cooperation", April 2003; Chaillot Paper 63, "The European Union, Getting a Bigger Bang For The Euro", August 2003; The Green Paper, EU Commission 23/9/04 Com (2004) 608 Final.

security, on threat perceptions and on the so called Solana paper,² the EU security strategy.

Security is apparently also central in the process of enlargement of the Union and reflects strongly on European thinking about Turkey's EU membership. Whether Turkey would be a force multiplier or a burden for the European security and defense is still an ongoing debate in some circles of Europe. Although the well known Copenhagen criteria, the yardstick for eligibility for EU membership, do not include any military context apart requiring from the candidate state a firm political control over the military, and neither is a candidate country expected to be militarily strong nor is a chapter opened for the military in the process of accession negotiations, military convergence with Turkey deserves to be taken into account. Such an outlook may not only contribute to the debate mentioned above but also facilitate further convergence to the benefit of both Turkey and the European Union, even before full membership is realized.

This paper will, firstly, attempt to highlight the degree of convergence between Turkey and the European Union in the military field and where divergences or impediments before convergence exist. Secondly, it will explore areas with potential for further convergence and conclude with some concrete proposals.

Convergence ought to be looked at for some consecutive and hierarchic layers. Mutual perceptions of each other and confidence provide the foundations for convergence. Here, one immediately sees the first obstacle to convergence. Mutual perceptions of each other are negatively affected by prejudices, bitter encounters of the past and are deep rooted. The Turks are the barbaric invaders and the Europeans are the crusaders in each other's eyes. Indeed, the Turks had been the very first booster of European integration for many centuries. On the other hand, it is against all hegemonic European powers that Turkey had to struggle for its survival, finally gaining its independence. These perceptions are still the cause of a good amount of mistrust on both sides. This feeling is particularly strong amongst the nationalists in Turkey, due to European attitude towards the PKK and on the issue of Cyprus where the Turkish Cypriots have been victimized to a policy of capitulation by the Europeans; not to mention European double standards in Kosovo

² Javier Solana, "A Secure Europe in a Better World" European Security Strategy, Brussels, December 2003.

and in Armenian-Azerbaijan issue. In return, the military's high profile in Turkish politics and society impacts negatively on the Europeans' confidence in Turkey. Many Europeans consider Turkey to be aggressive and irresponsible, non-European at the least.

Nonetheless, Turkey is not an exception in this respect; negative perceptions of each other is common among most if not all European countries, and this is the core reason why the Union is poised to overcome, once and for all, these bitter legacies of the past in order to build a better and more peaceful Europe. What counts is the party's determination to do so, and that determination is manifest in the progress achieved in Turkish – EU relations. This determination, the commitment to a better and peaceful Europe is the strategic choice that provides the platform over which military convergence could be realized. This platform has to be supported by legal and institutional structures. Once approved the constitution will provide the legal framework and ESDP structures are the forums in which practical convergence will be realized. Turkey stands staunchly on this platform without a place in the legal and institutional structures, and persists in asking to be involved in the decision making process and participating in the EU led operations particularly in areas where its interests are concerned and where it can play a role. The point to note at this stage is that so long as Turkey is left outside the military institutions of the EU, military convergence between Turkey and the EU would remain a prerogative of the EU. Just as it is the case in customs union, Turkey is holding the drums and the EU strikes the drumsticks.

In real life terms, however, convergence depends on whether or not Europe and Turkey share the same area of concern and have similar kinds of security interests and threat perceptions. Whether they find themselves on the same or on the opposing sides over security issues and international conflicts; whether or not they follow compatible criteria for the use of force, and to what extent their security is mutually dependent or supplementary, or mutually exclusive. It would also depend on whether the EU would require Turkish military backing to achieve its strategic objectives and whether their military capabilities and assets would meaningfully contribute to each other's security and defense. Would they have the determination to commit them to support each other? Can they agree on the same course of action and act cooperatively against the security challenges? And lastly, could they have a mutually satisfactory and reliable arrangement for equitable sharing of risks, burdens and benefits?

These questions represent conceptual and doctrinal layers and they can only be answered in detailed analyses pertaining to the EU's likely military engagements in the future. Nevertheless, military interaction between Turkey and Europe is not something new. Years of partnership in NATO and in the WEU as an associate member should not just be taken as a close acquaintance but an accumulation of similarities over a large aspect of military thinking, behavior and practice. Thus, military convergence between Turkey and Europe has a considerable background. So far, more than a thousand Turkish men in arms have already participated in EU led operations. In fact, Turkey is within the European security system; geographically, politically, militarily and any otherwise and cannot be excluded from it.

A quick comparison of the EU strategy with that of Turkey's shows that Turkey and the EU share the same perceptions about security challenges and threat, as well as on strategic objectives and their military implications. Terrorism and proliferation of WMD are at the top of the list of Turkey's security concerns;³ Turkey must be more worried about the international conflicts surrounding it. Even more, Turkey has its own conflicts with some of its neighbors, and thereby needs to maintain a higher level of readiness for defense. The likelihood of these conflicts leading to a clash would be less if Turkey were an EU member. Furthermore, Turkey would feel less dependent on its military for its security. For one thing, membership would bring Turkey within the envelope of European solidarity and the deterrence imbedded in this solidarity. In other words, Turkey can then count on the EU's support in standing against the threats and dangers it is facing. Second, membership would imply to the resolution of Cyprus and Aegean disputes and perhaps other issues as well. Third, Turkey's image in the neighborhood would be relieved of the make-up of the past.

If the EU is sincere about its strategy and is determined to implement it by hard power as much as by soft, it could not do so without Turkey's contribution in areas adjacent to Turkey. The most troubling regions in the periphery of Europe, namely the Middle East and Caucasus, cannot be treated militarily by the EU without Turkey getting militarily involved. The closer the Union is to the troubled areas the more influential it would be over them. On the other hand, Turkey could not, on its own, deal with terrorism, proliferation of the WMD, regional con-

³ www.tsk.mil.tr

flicts and organized crime, and it could not address the global challenges of our time.

No doubt the military's role in meeting contemporary security requirements is not so vital and expedient as it used to be. Now is not the time of the military. Security and even defense has for some time now ceased to be a matter of power equation and military strength. Even US military might is unable to ensure the security and defense of the US homeland, nor it can ensure an easy victory elsewhere even in the absence of a credible military adversary. Military demand and supply has never been so dubious, so hesitant and so awkward. The military has turned more into a back up force for the police and the gendarmerie, and became *the ultimate domestic and international punisher*. The soldier has to master in public relations as much as it does in combat in order to be able to carry out his primary tasks properly. The fashionable menace does not stem as much from high technology weapons systems as it does from hidden explosives, road mines, suicide bombers, mini-WMDs, the hackers and alike. While the militaries continue to be kept prepared to fight an eventual conventional war all nations seem to be in an endless effort to transform their militaries to meet the new requirements which are difficult to specify and hard to justify. This sketchy description of the situation is far from giving a clear picture of the main features of the military setting in global terms.

The world continues to be a very dangerous place. Despite the fact that it has become a *global village*, a community of highly interdependent states, it is not a homogeneous place. Differences prevail in a large spectrum so does the competition and conflict. Some can manage to cooperate and compete with others at the same time, while some chooses to challenge the status quo. So long as effective global governance does not exist confrontation of states and societies will continue; so will the need to use military power to accomplish desired ends. Therefore, a lot is still spent on military hardware, research and development.

The US is the sole military superpower. The US military is unchallenged in its reach and mobility, in its fire power, in technological capability, in readiness and sustainability, in space and in command, control and information. The US is determined to remain so. In other words, if the EU or any other power had the intention of becoming a superpower it would have to face US opposition. The US has the capability and possibility of influencing international relations through intimidation if it chooses to do so. US military superiority prompts and invites asymmetric response to the degree where a balancing effort is not seen feasible and practical.

Open and easy access to high technology products generates opportunities for the weak and vulnerabilities for the strong.

Technology provides for the military the possibility of making a brake through development of surprise capabilities. Thus, research and development is more important than ever. The moment a weapons system is fielded it is already technologically obsolete. Therefore, timing of fielding a weapons system has never been so critical. Sharing of technology, the market, the costs and the production must become the rule, not an exception, where military convergence is sought. Militarization of space, information warfare, war against terror all make co-operation imperative amongst the nations who share the same values and objectives as well as strengthening their cohesion through interdependence and transparency.

Comparatively, Europe is a highly secure place. A good number of European nations have ceased to perceive each other as enemies and almost all from the Atlantic to the Urals and even beyond have long agreed not to use military force to resolve their conflicts and in pursuit of their national interests. Although here and there militaries are kept handy just in case, to deter each other from a compelling surprise, as is the case between Turkey and Greece, they are all constrained in numbers by the CFE treaty that denies the nations to build a capability to intimidate or attack any other state in Europe. In the absence of an apparent threat, therefore, many European states had downsized their militaries even below the CFE treaty levels. The defensive role of the military is in a way only precautionary due to the fact that currently there is no outside power with the intention of posing a military threat against Europe. Nevertheless, military opportunities that technological advances provide may and can render the CFE obsolete.

Since it takes a long time to prepare and it still symbolizes national sovereignty total dismissal of the militaries will obviously remain out of question for a foreseeable future. Europe continues to spend a considerable amount of money for the military on an individual basis. However, the European Union is far from being a military power in global terms. Indeed, the EU is nowhere near becoming a military power despite the fact that cumulatively it spends 160 billion annually on military expenditure and possesses the most capable military after the United States. This is simply because the EU cannot have full convergence on security and defense issues. The ESDP is still tied to intergovernmental working methods and the decisions continue to be taken unanimously. Yet, European security strategy suggests that the EU plays the role that it should in global security and building a better world and that it devel-

ops a culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention; and be more capable and more coherent. It must be for this purpose that the European constitution introduces permanent structured co-operation as an instrument which makes co-operation more flexible when developing military capabilities. Member states whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area are given the opportunity to forge ahead quicker with a coordinated development of capabilities and to enhance co-operation in the field of armaments. The European Defense Agency (EDA)⁴ is established to contribute to the evaluation of military capabilities in the member states, working towards the harmonization of military capabilities and supporting joint efforts in the field of armaments.

The European constitution also amplifies the military requirements which also constitute a critical layer of conversion. There, the European constitution updates the *Petersberg Tasks* by adding new challenges such as joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post conflict stabilization. Amongst the instruments to be mobilized against the war on terror, and in cases of natural or man-made disasters the military is clearly essential, as well as for mutual support for common defense if a member state has been victim to an aggression on its own territory. With or without the European constitution,⁵ these requirements and arrangements are valid since they serve common interests and objectives while preserving intergovernmental nature of decision making.

In meeting these requirements, in terms of both capability and response the EU is seen far from developing a culture that fosters early, rapid and robust intervention. The Euro Force is yet to become operational with its full capability, whether the EDA will be able to meet the expectations is yet to be seen.⁶ Turkey currently responds to the EU's Headline Goals by offering to contribute a considerable size of force that would be made available for EU-led operations.

Turkey can be considered a subscriber to the EU strategy, since its own

⁴ Nick Witney, Europe's Capabilities' Conscience, NATO Review, Special Issue Spring 2005, Pg. 48-51.

⁵ Ulrich Petersohn/Sibyll Lang, The Future of the ESDP in the Wake of the Negative Referanda, SWP Comments, August 2005.

⁶ Uzi Eilam, The EDA, The Challenge for Israel's Defense Industry, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 25.7.04.

security strategy, so far as the global challenges and threat perceptions are concerned, is almost identical. Turkey can in no way shoulder a global responsibility by itself but it is prepared to contribute to regional stability by all means. Turkish soldiers, airmen and seamen have a proven capability in carrying out today's fashionable tasks with skill. Their cultural affiliation turns out to be an indispensable asset in peace keeping missions particularly in Muslim societies where they are most needed. Turkey has undertaken command of the ISAF in Afghanistan for two terms while Turkish soldiers were patrolling Kabul streets unarmed. Turkish airmen opened Kabul airport and operated it without any incident. While nations were reluctant to provide four helicopters there, Turkey stepped forward to do so. Bosnia was another spot where Turkish soldiers were most welcome.

Turkish army might still be largely a conscript force, but it is this conscription that makes it tailor made for the tasks assigned to it both at home and abroad, because it provides a reflection of Turkish society and it serves more than a military purpose. As modernization programs are implemented and it becomes more information oriented, the Turkish Army will inevitably become composed of professionals rather than conscripts. The Turkish air force, both in numbers and technological edge, is a strong competitor in the region, with capabilities to extend its reach and command and control assets. The Turkish air forces' air refueling and airborne command and control assets would be a highly valuable contribution to European military operations. The Turkish navy is already involved in both NATO and European on call force deployments in the Black Sea and in eastern Mediterranean. No doubt, Turkey's location would be the most critical contribution to European military capability were Europe to decide to engage in a military initiative in this part of the world.

In general terms, Turkey's military requirements correspond to those of the EU military requirements as a consequence of conceptual and doctrinal overlap. Years of combined defense planning, joint exercises, common practices and joint command and control in NATO attune Turkish military with its European counterparts in many respects.

Turkey actively pursues a non-proliferation policy amidst a region with an inclination to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Some of Turkey's neighbors are not parties to the organizations aiming at preventing the proliferation of WMD and have attempted to develop these weapons. Turkey observes anxiously and follows the transfers of dual use and sensitive material and technology to the coun-

tries of this region while advocating a WMD-free Middle East. Turkey does not possess WMD and shows no intention of having them. It adheres to all major international treaties regarding non-proliferation of those weapons and their delivery means. Furthermore, it actively participates and supports all works pertaining to non-proliferation in NATO. Turkey became party to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 and has received 6 inspections, so far, by the Chemical Weapons Prohibition Organization. Similarly, Turkey signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974, and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1980; it ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999. Furthermore, Turkey has also been active in export control regimes regarding the WMD and their delivery means, related material and technologies. In 1996, it became a founding member of the Wassenaar Arrangement and a year later it became a party to the Missile Technology Control Regime, promoting the non-proliferation of missiles together with associated production technologies and material. In 2002, Turkey chose to join the Australian Group, a regime stricter than the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention; as well as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which performs export controls of materials used in nuclear technology and dual use materials; and the Zangger Committee, controlling nuclear agents, materials and technologies.⁷

There is a growing circle in Turkey arguing in favor of acquiring the capabilities to deny adversaries the benefits of WMDs. When in the years to come these capabilities – including passive and active defenses as well as improved counterforce means – are acquired, they will enable Turkey to strengthen deterrence and provide an effective defense should deterrence fail. The Turkish Armed Forces should assure the necessary capabilities to fight, survive and prevail in nuclear, biological and chemical scenarios. It is imperative that NATO's security guaranties, which center around the US nuclear commitments in Europe, together with Turkey's own national defense capabilities remains convincing to Turkey as well as to its WMD armed neighbors.⁸

In terms of hardware Turkish military is more American than European. Turkish armed forces' technologic capabilities are largely acquired from foreign sources and mostly from the US, owing essentially to US's policy oriented weapons sales and transfer practices. From mid 1970s

⁷ www.tsk.mil.tr

⁸ Turkey Defence and Security, Report Q1 2005, Bussiness Monitoring International, pg.18.

onwards, Turkey has been in a deliberate effort to develop its own defense industries and technological base, and to get away from being a solely source-dependent, acquired military power. For different reasons, apart from a few number of occasions – such as the Rapier, CN-235s - European industries could not taken over the lead in providing military hardware to Turkey and been very reluctant in the transfer of defense technology which had been a precondition for any substantive deal Turkey was about to make. At the end, increasing military co-operation with Israel and lifting of cold-war-imposed restrictions have increased Turkey's choices in weapons procurement, in technologic and industrial co-operation. Indeed, Turkey's rapprochement with Israel, to a certain extent, can be attributed to European reluctance in letting Turkey close its ranks with Europe.

Recently, Turkey has taken steps to consolidate its defense industries and at the same time disengaged them from their foreign partners. Space and electronics and information systems are Turkey's rising areas of interest. Research and development, for the first time is receiving high priority and emphasis in all areas where potential exists. Turkey keenly looks for the possibilities of participation in NATO and European consortiums and with its increasing technological base it is more likely that it would keep doing so.

Its large mechanical production facilities and skilled work force would make Turkey a valuable partner of defense industries around the world by increasing their competitiveness in cost and market orientation. On the other hand, pooling Turkey's own requirements with those of other EU countries could help make many projects feasible and could help the EU overcome its inwardness.

In conclusion, it can be said that military convergence between Turkey and the EU is an obvious step in creating a peaceful and prosperous Europe. Turkey is already within the European security architecture and closely associated with the ESDP. Further military convergence is impeded by shortage of mutual thrust and by lack of a formal contractual engagement that could be realized only by membership.

The scope and dimensions of military convergence would be contingent upon the role the EU would like to assign to the military. Turkey with its geography and military assets could be an indispensable element of European military power.

Once an EU member, Turkey can contribute to the development of European military capabilities through rationalization of requirements and through pooling of resources.

The military is a field where the unexpected cannot be afforded. Timeliness is not just desirable but an overriding criterion of the military. The unpredictable dictates military readiness. For the EU it is high time to engage Turkey militarily for full convergence. Institutional flexibility is necessary to allow Turkey to participate in European security structures. The time to pass until Turkey takes its seat in European Defense Agency would be a waste of time.

6. MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL ASPECTS OF EUROPE-TURKEY RELATIONS

Sandro Ferracuti and Michele Nones

From the fall of the Berlin Wall until today, the world has witnessed a continual explosion of regional crises that have involved a huge number of countries, directly or indirectly. Resurgent or newborn nationalism, pressing economic interests, unavoidable social issues, and religious integralism have brought about an instability unparalleled in the recent past. From the risk of a catastrophic, though hypothetical, general nuclear war, we have moved to a myriad of more limited, but real and bloody local crises, flowing from the current phenomenon of international terrorism that tends to be seen as the only threat the community needs to confront. As has often happened before, there exists a strong tendency to form hypotheses about the future and to set out future courses of action based on present-day situations, on things which newspaper headlines bring to our attention every day, and thereby repeating the mistakes of those generals who criticised themselves for planning future operations based on past ones.

National governments often tend to concentrate their efforts on short-term projects, under pressure as they are from the demands of the budget and of what public opinion feels is essential for the security of the moment. A more detached analysis of the evolution of international situations and of the crises that we have seen in the recent past ought, on the contrary, to advise giving greater attention to the issue of security in a wider and more diversified framework.

The signs seem relatively clear that show the present situation to be a phase, extremely delicate, of restabilisation of balances in the world, of

redefinition of goals, and of affirmation of the main players after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the reestablishment, though difficult and problematic, of more stable conditions in a great country like Russia, with the emergence of new economic leaders, with the unstoppable struggle for survival on the part of desperate and long-forgotten peoples, with the confrontation of religions substituting for ideologies as a means of cementing the masses and leading them forward.

None of this allows us to foresee with any reliability the future crises to be dealt with, or what tools will be required to achieve the objectives that the European Union sets or will set. Nothing, in particular, allows us to exclude the hypothesis that one day it will be necessary to take on military operations on a vast scale, those which in the USA are clearly defined as "major wars".

This, naturally, should not be taken to mean accepting a secondary role on the world stage, a role that does not correspond with the political, economic, industrial, technological, and human potential of Europe.

If this is not considered acceptable, as would seem where credit is given to the often extremely lively debate that occurs in European countries, then it would appear obvious that both the current situation and its anticipated developments require that the European Union take action to enable itself to respond more fully and autonomously, with an adequate level of security, to any possible menace. This ability to respond would need to be able to make the best possible use of everything the information age has to offer, that is, integration on the internet, following the principles of Network Centric Warfare, in order to profit from all the available information resources and to transform this informational advantage into military superiority, with the goal of attaining the desired results in the best possible way (effect-based operations).

In accordance with the Headline Goal of 2010, Europe should be capable of responding rapidly and decisively to all possible crises, non only those contemplated by Petersberg, but also those that require joint action for disarmament and third-country support to fight terrorism and to reform the security sector. Europe must be capable of acting before the crisis degenerates, with preventive action to avoid such a deterioration. It must be able to conduct and maintain concurrent operations, at different levels of involvement. Interoperability, as well as sustainability and accurate forecasting must be the crucial points of the objective to be reached by 2010.

Flexible, mobile, and integratable forces will be necessary. A better use of available resources will be required, with shared use of assets, as well

as a large increment of multinational forces. These capacities do not consist solely and simply in the size, gifts, and preparation of security and defense forces, but presuppose a long-term search for possible partners, a grouping of countries which recognise their own common needs and goals, careful regional balances, and policies which would facilitate integration rather than creating fractures and oppositions.

All this will not be easy to achieve, even less so in an area like Europe and the Mediterranean, since time immemorial a crossroads of civilisations, religions, and different if not openly opposing economic interests. In this picture, a simple glance at the map, perhaps with some reference to past history, cannot but show the relevance of a country like Turkey for the favourable definition of strategic regional balances, defense, and the security of Europe.

Others may indicate the key role that Turkey may have in the search for a possible, fruitful, coexistence of the Islamic religion with lay and democratic state structures. Others yet may refer to the economic importance of the region of Anatolia. Still others may underline the risks posed to an enduring stability in the whole area of the Caucasus and Middle East that would derive from a Turkey rejected by the Western world to which it feels it belongs and to which it has been favourably inclined, with determination, admirable continuity, and undeniable success for many decades.

Here we need both to analyse the role that Turkey will be able to play in collective security when it is inserted as a full member of the European Union and to try, thereafter, to define what measures could increase its efficiency.

Turkish security policy has always pursued the following, with determination and coherence:

- the maintenance of its national independence and sovereignty, and its territorial integrity;
- the prevention of crises and conflicts that might put national security at risk, including participation in international initiatives.

With alacrity and without hesitation, the Turkish ruling class saw in NATO the most suitable instrument for guaranteeing the security of the country. From the moment in which the Western world became aware of the necessity of making common cause in order to confront the menace from the Soviet sphere and thereby giving birth to NATO, Turkey has been an integral, faithful, coherent and active partner in this communion of sovereign states that share the same values of liberty and democracy.

Turkey's choice of a Western alliance immediately solidified with its membership and active participation in all NATO initiatives, and not only that: its involvement in the Korean War at the side of the United States confirmed its clear choice of sides. Its armed forces were rapidly and efficiently integrated with those of the other countries of the alliance, which won respect and great consideration, and thereby contributed decisively to Turkey's tendency to favour the West. Even with some of its closest neighbours, with some of whom relations had been historically full of conflict, common membership in NATO permitted the development of gradual, progressive mutual trust, and formed the means and meeting place for finding peaceful solutions to long-standing problems.

The awareness of being an essential part of a system that sees collective security and close collaboration as the key to everyone's security has made reciprocal understanding and cohabitation much easier.

On a more strictly military level, the Alliance was well aware of the key role played by Turkey in the defense of the south-east flank of Europe. Turkey was given the task of surveillance and defense of very far-flung geographic borders, in direct contact with the Soviet Union and of a whole area characterised by great instability, of unclear political alliance, and of vital importance for Western and particularly European interests. The lines of communication for maritime traffic from the Middle East to the Mediterranean basin were and are still in large part dependent for their security on the protection of their Mediterranean access points, and on control of the middle-eastern coastal strip, all areas closely observed from Turkish territory.

Turkey is well-placed, therefore, as a natural bastion for the defense of the territory and interest of the Alliance from threats from Warsaw Pact countries in southeastern Europe.

To the Turkish army fell the task of confronting the ground troops of the Soviet Union, perhaps coming from the Caucasus region, and to block access to the lands of south-east Europe and the Mediterranean from the air forces of Warsaw Pact nations.

Even in the most tense years of the confrontation between East and West, the area of Anatolia and the Caucasus remained safe and well-guarded. In some cases, the Turkish air force intervened forcefully and efficiently to counteract hostile action, demonstrating its determination, its good training, the means at its disposal, and the well-placement of their bases.

With the end of the dual conflict and the dissolution of the USSR, the military capacity of Turkey has seen its own centrality in Western

strategy decline, where previously its ground troops had been assigned an important value as a deterrent. Indeed, dominant opinion tended to portray Turkey as a burden and not an asset for the construction of European security, principally for its problems of ongoing democratisation, connected to a strong internal instability, and for the nearness of the country with “turbulent” regions.

The decision of the European Union, in the late 90s, to find a place for Turkey in the field of security and defense has made it possible to overcome this impasse. In this context, having elevated Turkey to the rank of candidate nation was seen more as a re-evaluation of the worth of Turkey as a security producer in Europe. Moreover, enlargement has extended the boundaries of the Union into politically and economically instable areas, sometimes involved in territorial and ethnic conflicts, as in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Gulf. These areas are crucial to the interests and security of Europe, and for those reasons the strategic position of Turkey has been evaluated generally as a good neighbour, based on recent relations.

Economic and financial instability have not prevented Turkey from developing solid cultural, political, economic, and military ties with the countries of central Asia. It has become an important commercial and military partner for the states of the Caucasus, apart from Armenia (for historical reasons). It was also among the promoters of the organisation for economic cooperation among countries in the Black Sea region. An agreement over military cooperation and of free exchange binds it to Israel and it is able to play a far from unimportant role in mediating conflicts between Israel and Palestine. The war in Iraq has brought about a rapprochement with Syria and Iran, through the common fear of a renascent Kurdish nationalism, even if in the case of Iran anxieties remain over the country’s nuclear program.

Having gotten past the cases in which Europe and Turkey were at odds over the possibility of the EU taking over some NATO structures for independent operations, Turkey is now taking part in all the military and direct policing operations of the Union, from Bosnia-Hezegovina to Macedonia and the Congo. These missions are alongside those under NATO leadership in Kosovo and Afghanistan, in training countries taking part in the Partnership for Peace, in military assistance to Azerbaijan and Georgia, in antiterrorist operations in the Mediterranean, and in the provision of security along the trade routes of the Black Sea. Moreover, Turkey has signed a letter of intent, in May 2005, along with Italy and Romania, to form a battle group, prepared to cover weekly periods of operative readiness

from the second half of 2010, and has expressed the intention of being part of the European Defense Agency.

While the desire to participate in the European Defense Agency confirms the general guidelines of Turkish foreign policy, membership in the battle group is of even greater importance. In fact, the capacity to respond rapidly to a crisis requires the capacity to marshal military formations of high readiness, both as an independent force and as components of a larger operation, based on successive phases. The so-called "battle groups" are a key element for this goal, independent bodies of the military, 1500 men strong, formed of the necessary naval and aerial components, capable of operating wherever needed in the arc of ten days after the decision to intervene is taken.

Italy has welcomed the Turkish intention to participate in the European battle groups now being formed, to give full support to the European aspirations of that country, bearing in mind the present excellent relations and of the positive course of bilateral cooperation. The Turkish contribution will be inserted into the Italian national land battle group. The form of this contribution has not yet been established, but will embrace a variety of plans: combat, combat support, and combat service support, as well as those of strategic mobility. Leaving aside the exact constitution of the plans, Turkish participation in this battle group will permit not only the return of a nation capable of solid military contributions within the EU military structure, but also the ability to gain greater flexibility of responsibility in various possible scenarios.

Joint training will begin in 2007, with Full Operational Capability anticipated by the end of 2009. These are the latest indications of the convergence of Turkish foreign policy and security with those of the European Union.

The country thus should be considered one of the pillars of the security of the Euro-Mediterranean area and a safe bridge for the development of the European presence in areas where its influence has so far been limited. Turkey's link to the European context will harmonise with European policies even more strongly in the southern regions, setting alongside the "western dimension" a new and strong "southern dimension".

From Turkish territory it will be easy to prevent direct air operations coming from the Caucasus and Middle East toward the countries of southern and Balkan Europe, just as huge areas of the eastern Mediterranean will be able to be controlled. The availability of its territory and of its air bases is essential for the management of crises which

will involve the area stretching from Iraq to Iran and Afghanistan. The contribution that a friendly Turkey closely integrated in a European defense framework could give to the control and stability of the region is, therefore, of absolute relevance. A fundamental role can be assigned to its military capacities. The number of men under arms (515,000 men), a strong air force (445 combat airplanes of which half are modern), a significant marine (24 frigates of which more than half are up to date and 11 modern submarines), the motivation, determination, and traditional discipline of the Turkish Armed Forces, the heightened level of training inspired by Western models and undertaken over the course of decades of active participation in NATO exercises and in the more recent multinational operations, the good provision of vehicles and arms, upheld by a conspicuous defense budget (150 billion dollars of investment anticipated over the next 30 years), the rapid growth of a native defense industry, desired by past governments and accelerated recently, make of the Turkish Armed Forces an element of significant weight for the North Atlantic alliance and represent a definite increase in the efficacy of European defense. Certainly, as this efficacy should be maximised, it will be necessary to undertake the integration of the Turkish forces into the command structures of the European Union, at all levels, and to effect a greater standardisation of armaments with those of the armed forces of the European nations.

This is a process already underway, when one considers the current presence in the Turkish arms inventory of weapons systems both on land and on sea planned and produced in Europe. In addition, one must remember the decision to fulfill the planning and development capacity of the defense industry, considered the underlying element of the development of the national high technology sector and indeed of the system of production in general.

Reaching this objective requires the contribution of the industries of the European countries, which should be more ready to share non-US technology. It is this condition which reinserts the defense industry sector among those in which the process of integrating Turkey into the EU can quickly produce trustworthy positive results, favoured also by the potential take-off of the Turkish economy and by the presence of a young workforce, well-educated and highly qualified.

The modernisation of the Turkish Armed Forces can, therefore, find valid solutions with systems already in production in European countries or with developments linked with new systems. Particularly promising is the aerospace sector, where the Turkish demand for satellites, aircraft carriers, fight-

er planes, and training craft, as well as surveillance, command, and control systems, may find a wide range of satisfying solutions among the available materials in Europe, or perhaps in joint development and production.

With the expansion of the national defense industry, furthermore, Turkey will tend to gain a certain autonomy in satisfying the demands of the armed forces, with the double goal of reducing dependence on American imports (which make up 60% of the current equipment) and of avoiding any possible consequent political or diplomatic implications of that dependence.

To contribute to this growth and modernisation of Turkish forces, Italian industry offers itself as a credible and trustworthy candidate, as it has the technological capacity to fulfill the demands of the present situation, directed toward Network Centric Warfare, but also because Italy has always favoured the inclusion of Turkey in the EU without political conditions, apart from those aimed at promoting the achievement of preliminary objectives for the integration of Turkey into the European community.

Not only that, but the presence of the Italian defense industry already has a good basis, as is confirmed by various initiatives already come to maturation and others that are underway.

In the helicopter sector, Agusta Westland has provided AB 412 helicopters already on their way, and the same company has already been preselected, along with the South African company Denel, in the competition for the acquisition of attack helicopters, where important European and American competitors were excluded. The proposed helicopter is the A129, the same kind used by the Italian Army, and it may eventually be produced in Turkey with a related transfer of technology. In the field of electronic defense, too, there are numerous joint programs of industrial coproduction, which involve the main Italian companies in the sector. The updating of the air fleet of the Navy is already underway, with ten ATR 72 aircraft destined for patrolling and surveillance missions, produced by the Italian-French joint venture under the control of Finmeccanica-Alenia Aeronautica and EADS. Some interest has been shown in the C27J tactical transport aircraft which might replace the Casa CN 235 which is currently being used by Turkish aeronautics, so as to enable the sending of a more powerful aircraft better adapted to operations out of the area, as well as being capable of transporting standard NATO pallets. In the workshop an industrial collaboration might develop in the field of patrolling craft. In the field of space, the Turkish ministry of defense has expressed the intention of acquiring surveillance capacity from satellites and Italian

companies are developing the Cosmo-Skymed system, one of the most technologically and operatively advanced.

Furthermore, Turkey has been proposed as the fifth partner of the Eurofighter Typhoon consortium, with involvement in the assembly and maintenance of the aircraft. This country is already involved in the American Joint Strike Fighter (or F35 Lightning II) program, and is deciding whether to opt for that system or to choose both, as is expected by Great Britain and Italy. In the latter case, synergies could develop between Italy and Turkey in joint activities for the JSF aircraft destined for European air fleets.

Reference to combat aircraft suggests a further consideration of the air defense of Europe, both as regards classic threats and those brought by unconventional means and methods, those typically undertaken by terrorist organisations. Or, perhaps, it might be better to speak more generally of air power, as an increaser of force and the operative arm of policy.

The peculiar characteristics of air power have made it one of the most effective tools to set beside political action in today's crises. It permits dynamic action without limitations of time and space in deterrence activities, at the beginning of a crisis, and of compulsion, to wear out an adversary in the first phase of a conflict. Air power, freed of material and territorial bonds, has taken the place of a policy of cannon-fire. In fact, for deterrence and compulsion, sea power today undertakes its duty as the offensive arm, with the task of carrying aircraft and of other suitable platforms for the launching of planes or missiles.

Turkey is an efficient and irreplaceable "aircraft carrier" for European air power for security and defense. Indeed, from its territory air attacks on Europe from aircraft coming from the most unstable Middle Eastern and Caucasus areas can be stopped and the possible areas of origin of these threats can be kept under control and eventually neutralised. The participation of the Turkish air force in its own command and control structure, joint training, availability of modern aircraft for air defense, their complete standardisation and methods shared with other European air fleets would be a formidable addition to the strategic capacities of Europe.

The joint training of aircraft would be, as well as a requirement for efficient operation and an economically favourable solution, a further step forward in the cementing of those relations of trust and friendship that have already been established between Turkish air force personnel and the personnel of other European air forces, particularly the Italians, through shared participation in multinational activities.

It is therefore to be recommended that Europe and Turkey find in this

area, too, a way to accelerate integration and to share the benefits that could come about in the area of security.

For the EU there exist, therefore, many good reasons to proceed with determination and care in the Turkish integration process.

Turkey would see its active and faithful participation in the defense of the West rewarded, in the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance and more recent multinational operations. Its entrance in the European Union would anchor it closely to European value systems and would contribute decisively to the search for balanced relations with the Islamic world, which is much to be desired for the security and stability of a critical region of our planet.

(Translation: Anthony Majanlahti)

CONCLUSIONS

Stefano Silvestri

The European Union (EU) needs to address an entirely new prospect. The latest enlargements have brought its population to about 450 million, its frontiers on land are now about 6000 kilometres long, and on sea are more than 85000, and that is not all, because soon it will enlarge again to reach the Black Sea and will envelop the western Balkan states which are not yet members (but which want to be) in a kind of enclave. At the same time it must address the changes in the international security situation, giving increasing attention to the unusual threats of international terrorism and organised crime, attending concerns about instability and lack of security in the vast areas along its borders, on which it greatly depends for a secure energy supply, facing the proliferation of old and new weapons of mass destruction, and so on.

The EU, considered until now a “civil” player, “regional” in its political goals, needs to come to terms with a “region” that includes countries like Russia and the Ukraine, areas like the Caucasus and the Caspian, the whole Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa, and with crises that demand a much greater international presence and action and often, indeed, armed intervention.

Old tools and political habits were clearly insufficient to address this new situation. Thus both Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) were developed. A new approach to the region’s countries was put into place with the tools of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the first steps were begun toward an energetic common policy, and a new, more integrated

approach to big transnational crises (like organised crime, international terrorism, migratory movements, great epidemics, and so on) which could not be effectively dealt with on the basis of traditional bilateral and/or local relationships.

It is in this context that a somewhat baffling and incomprehensible debate about the “boundaries of Europe” enters the picture, a debate which seeks to give both a geographical and a cultural identity to this Asian peninsula, blending philosophical and religious traditions to form a whole as ambitious as it is inconclusive. Christian Europe, which nonetheless includes Islamic peoples (a growing group, thanks in part to immigration as well as the extension of EU boundaries), or Greco-Roman Europe (which, once again, includes a large part of today’s Turkey) are only two of the “identifying” parameters which have come to be used time after time in order not to address the inevitable, that is, the mixing of Europe and Asia. Such a mixing has always existed, from prehistoric migrations which populated the European peninsula, and today particularly characterises key regions like Russia, the Caucasus, and Anatolia.

In this confusion the debate begins over the entrance of Turkey into the Union. This is a debate about a great country at the junction between Europe and Asia, whose inhabitants are for the most part of the Islamic religion, economically still under development (even if, with the passage of time, its market and the characteristics of its economy seem ever more easily absorbable into the greater European market). This is a country which throughout its long history has found itself the seat and centre of a great empire, a mighty antagonist of many great European powers, which has tried in the past to attain mastery over both east-central Europe (arriving as near as Vienna), and the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey is an ex-great power which for a great deal of time has acted as the power of reference for the countries on the southern shore of that sea, which challenged Russia on the Black Sea, blocking its push south, and which has been, for a long time, an important element of European equilibrium and a respected commercial partner.

Turkey is not historically or culturally outside the boundaries of Europe, even less so when, having freed itself of its Caliph and its Ottoman governing system, it became a republic, resolutely lay and strictly modelled on the European model. But at the same time it is a partner rich in history, and thus also in myths and false perceptions deeply rooted in the European cultural imagination, from the point of the great break between Europe and the Mediterranean brought about by the collapse

of the Roman Empire in the west, and of the rapid expansion of Arab Islam all the way to the Iberian peninsula. The historical reality matters but little, as does the fact that the passage from Arab empire to that of the Turks (beyond enabling the Spanish "reconquista") indicated the beginning of a slow but progressive "Europeanization" of the Turkish Islamic world, making it an integral part, in times and ways often paradoxical and contradictory, of that which was to become the economic and cultural flowering of the European Renaissance. The image of the antagonist remains, along with the impression that it could never be completely "assimilated" and made to blend in: a rhetorical image, which passions and political and economic interests can easily play upon, making the success of the process of enlargement of the Union quite complex.

Enlargement to include Turkey is therefore a decision of great historic and political impact, which will profoundly affect the very nature of the Union, its ambitions and its international role. One thing seems quite certain: such an enlargement will be much more difficult and problematic without a substantial reinforcement from the PESC and the PESD. Turkey has been a member of the Atlantic Alliance since 1952, and, in the years of the Cold War, was considered the essential bastion of NATO against Soviet expansionism toward the Mediterranean and the Middle East, as well as being the strongest link in a chain of containment that for some time had also included Iran and Pakistan. Subsequently this perception became in some way reversed, bearing in mind, more than anything else, the risk factors, instability and insecurity that afflicted the area, from conflicts with the Kurds (who had strong tensions with Syria, Iraq, and Iran), to terrorism, criminality, conflicts with Greece on the Aegean and on the question of Cyprus.

The situation got progressively better in the Nineties, even if not all the problems were solved (it is sufficient to bear in mind the Cyprus question, which still in part blocks diplomatic relations between Brussels and Ankara). Above all the European perception of the insecure factors has changed, becoming much more widespread and global than had been thought initially, while the cooperation between the EU and Turkey has greatly grown, at least since 1992, in the area of security and of the handling of crises: from that date, indeed, Turkey has taken part in nearly every military and policing operation conducted under the EU aegis. To these we may also add operations undertaken under the command of NATO. In particular, Turkey also pledged to take part in the "battle group" of the EU along with Italy and Romania, and is interested in par-

ticipating in the European Defense Agency. Finally, it appears that an increasing convergence is occurring between the foreign policy decisions of Turkey and those of the EU, accompanied by significant reforms that show a tendency to align the Turkish legal, political, and institutional systems with European standards. Turkey has thereby adhered to the European declarations on terrorism and non-proliferation, even though it has not signed the treaty for the establishment of an international penal court, and its political positions, in particular those on the recent crisis in the Middle East, are significantly more in line with those of Brussels than with those of Washington.

The Turkish interest in an accord with the EU has grown, an accord which in some way might compensate for the situation of greater international isolation for which the country suffers, due to a pronounced American unilateralism on the subjects of security and defense. The fragmentation of the USSR has brought about an increased intrinsic volatility and danger in the new independent states in the Caucasus. Ankara quickly recognised the new independent republics in the Caucasus, and it has good relations with Azerbaijan and more recently with Georgia (thanks also to common interests linked to the export of crude oil), but has not yet established regular relations with Armenia, which which it has problems defining the common border, as well as disagreements on the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (Turkey has taken the Azeri stance) and the question of a Turkish recognition of the Armenian genocide of 1915. This is not a knot impossible to untangle, but it could certainly further complicate Turkish-European relations.

Not even the relative economic weakness of Turkey has prevented it from profiting from the disappearance of the USSR, transforming Turkey into a pole of regional attraction for all the ex-Soviet countries of central Asia in which reside significant Turkish-speaking populations. National evolution (and the risk of nuclear proliferation) that characterised this phase of the Islamic regime of Tehran constitutes another source of serious worry that joins with the anxiety that the Iraq crisis will sooner or later escape from the hands of American control or in any case might finish by worsening the security problems on the southern border (as well as reawakening Kurdish nationalism).

More interesting for the relationship between Turkey and the EU is the area around the Black Sea. Turkish policy was very active in this area of crucial strategic interest, pushing it to promote the institution of an association of interested countries that came to life in 1992, the

Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), between the common coast-sharers Turkey, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, and the Ukraine, and countries not sharing the same coast, Albania, Armenia, Greece, Moldova, and, from 1994, Serbia-Montenegro. Even though until now the BSEC has not been particularly active, the upcoming entrance of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU, to which Greece already belonged, the status of Turkey's candidacy and the fact that all the other member states are interested in the PEV or have special relations with the EU could make a distinct difference in the role of the BSEC.¹

In all these cases Turkey, for the Union, may represent an advantage, but also an added problem, according to the role it intends to play and of the positions it assumes. In any case it has begun to play a very significant role in the energy security of Europe, thanks to the oil pipeline that joins Baku on the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, which soon should be linked to another new pipeline between Kashagan (in Kazakhstan) and Baku. At the same time Turkey very much needs the cooperation of the EU in order to increase its negotiating strength and to try to stabilise the most serious risks, which should push it to take initiatives in line with the interests and perceptions of Europe (and thereby increasing the country's usefulness to the EU). Thus there is a real possibility that Turkey could come to create a "virtuous circle" which European nations would have every interest in sustaining and encouraging, and which would contribute to developing Turkish security in the area.

This is not to say that such potential will ever come to fruition. The obstacle formed by the Cypriot question remains serious and dangerous, so much so that the possibility that the very length of the negotiations begun between Turkey and the EU might finish by cooling off Turkish enthusiasm and reducing Turkish tendencies toward collaboration. But the most serious risk is in Europe, and derives from the deep uncertainty that still dominates the political scene in many key countries of the EU, principally France (but also Germany, insofar as regards the admission of Turkey into the Union). It is paradoxical to imagine negotiations going on for ten or twelve years, arriving at a positive conclusion, only to then submit the final decision to the electorate of even only one

¹ See in particular Roberto Aliboni, "Globalization and the Wider Black Sea Area: Interaction with the European Union, Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 6, n. 2, June 2006, pp. 157-168.

member country of the Union, with the serious risk of suddenly invalidating the whole process. A similar basic uncertainty can do nothing but weigh negatively upon the process of progressive integration of Turkey into Europe, limiting its impact and usefulness.

Moreover, important reasons exist which should push the EU to look positively upon the prospect of full Turkish integration, and in a not excessive timeframe. Some of those reasons have already been cited, but it is nonetheless interesting to look at them all together.

They centre on the great strategic importance of the physical location and political position of Turkey, and include disparate arguments such as the struggle against organised crime and terrorism and energy security policy. More generally, the entrance of Turkey would permit the Union to impose a widespread policy regarding the region of the Black Sea and probably also of the Caucasus. In the Mediterranean, Turkish entry would move the entire northern curve of the Mediterranean into the interior of the EU, creating an institutional and economic unit that went from the Atlantic to central Asia and which could become one of the important axes of European policy, increasing its global, as well as regional, importance. Finally, the entrance of an Islamic country of such importance as a full member state of the EU would put an end, once and for all, to the myths of the “difference” of Islam and would inflict a strategic defeat on all those who would point toward a “clash of civilisations”.

Nevertheless, reaching these objectives cannot be left solely to hope for a positive conclusion to the negotiating process currently underway. It is necessary to prepare and to favour the integration of Turkey with Europe through a more marked and decisive concerted action of coordination that in some way ought to move the remaining problems (from Cyprus to the Armenian question, from the problem of the Kurdish minorities to differences over human rights) to second place, thereby making it easier, and less dramatic, to overcome them. Such coordination ought both to gradually prepare European public opinion to have a favourable position about the admission of Turkey into the EU and to “normalise” the image of the country. This is a process already underway, at least regarding the economy (see, for example, the growing European investment in Turkey), and which certainly will grow through the negotiations over the ongoing acceptance, by Turkey, of the body of EU community standards (which would include crucial aspects of democracy and human rights). It is, on the other hand, a process which has already taken too long precisely on the most important strategic points for Europe, specifically security, defense, and foreign policy. A strong devel-

opment in these areas could, in the final analysis, make the difference between success and failure.

The key point of cooperation in the area of defense, however, comes first within the PESC: great political choices will guide the next moves of the Union and will determine the possibility of increasing the role and the participation of Turkey. Unfortunately, as we have noted elsewhere, while some institutional links exist (no matter how incomplete and insufficient) between Turkey and the PESD, there are no equivalent mechanisms for the PESC, which, however, urgently need to be developed.

The strategic-military choices of Turkey, as for the rest of the member states of the EU, will be determined by the positions that will be assumed on a few key international issues, such as the following:

1. the opportunity to develop a thorough strategic approach regarding the area of the Black Sea,
2. the adoption by Europe of a comprehensive policy of sustaining the stabilisation of Iraq in its politics and violent conflicts (here included a definitive clarification about the precise settlement of the Kurdish question),
3. A greater coordination on the necessity of sorting out and reducing the ongoing situation of conflict in the Caucasus, including the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan in a dialogue,
4. the development of a comprehensive policy on energy security,
5. the Iran dossier and nuclear proliferation.

A greater level of agreement in these sectors could be reinforced and sustained both on the level of industrial cooperation and on the military-operative level, foreseeing, at least in this area, the future integration of Turkey in the EU, making it even more easy and likely to take place.

Index (1996-2006)

- La politica europea dell'Italia. Un dibattito aperto, *a cura di Raffaello Matarazzo* (n. 26, novembre 2006, pp. 153)
- Integrazione europea e opinione pubblica italiana, *a cura di Michele Comelli e Ettore Greco* (n. 25, maggio 2006, pp. 72)
- Nuove forme di procurement per la difesa, *Sara Mezzio* (n. 24, giugno 2005, pp. 85)
- Francia-Italia: relazioni bilaterali, strategie europee/France-Italie: relations bilatérales, stratégies européennes, *di Jean-Pierre Darnis* (n. 23, marzo 2005, pp. 96)
- La Politica europea di vicinato, *di Riccardo Alcaro e Michele Comelli*, (n. 22, marzo 2005, pp. 68)
- La nuova Costituzione dell'Unione e il futuro del Parlamento europeo, *Collegio europeo di Parma, Centro studi sul federalismo, Istituto Affari Internazionali* (n. 21, giugno 2004, pp. 127)
- L'articolo 296 Tce e la regolamentazione dei mercati della difesa, *Riccardo Monaco* (n. 20, gennaio 2004, pp. 109, pp. 109)
- Processi e le politiche per l'internazionalizzazione del sistema Italia, *a cura di Paolo Guerrieri* (n. 19, novembre 2003, pp. 130)
- Il terrorismo internazionale dopo l'11 settembre: l'azione dell'Italia, *di Antonio Armellini e Paolo Trichilo* (n. 18, luglio 2003, pp. 120)
- Il processo di integrazione del mercato e dell'industria della difesa in Europa, *a cura di Michele Nones, Stefania Di Paola e Sandro Ruggeri* (n. 17, maggio 2003, pp. 34)
- *Presenza ed impegni dell'Italia nelle Peace Support Operations*, di Linda Landi, (n. 16, gennaio 2003, pp. 83)
- *La dimensione spaziale della politica europea di sicurezza e difesa*, a cura di Michele Nones, Jean Pierre Darnis, Giovanni Gasparini, Stefano Silvestri, (n. 15, marzo 2002, pp. 48)
- *Il sistema di supporto logistico delle Forze Armate italiane: problemi e prospettive*, a cura di Michele Nones, Maurizio Cremasco, Stefano Silvestri (n. 14, ottobre 2001, pp. 74)
- *Il Wto e la quarta Conferenza internazionale: quali scenari?*, a cura di Isabella Falautano e Paolo Guerrieri (n. 13, ottobre 2001, pp. 95)
- *Il Wto dopo Seattle: scenari a confronto*, a cura di Isabella Falautano e Paolo Guerrieri (n. 12, ottobre 2000, pp. 86)
- *Il ruolo dell'elicottero nel nuovo modello di difesa*, a cura di Michele Nones e Stefano Silvestri (n. 11, settembre 2000, pp. 81)
- *Il Patto di stabilità e la cooperazione regionale nei Balcani*, a cura di Ettore Greco (n. 10, marzo 2000, pp. 43)
- *Politica di sicurezza e nuovo modello di difesa*, di Giovanni Gasparini (n. 9, novembre 1999, pp. 75)

- *Il Millenium Round, il Wto e l'Italia*, a cura di Isabella Falautano e Paolo Guerrieri (n. 8, ottobre 1999, pp. 103)
- *Trasparenza e concorrenza nelle commesse militari dei paesi europei*, di Michele Nones e Alberto Traballese, (n. 7, dicembre 1998, pp. 31)
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